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Abstract
Do languages matter beyond their communicative benets? We explore
the potential role of preferences over the language of use, theoretically and
empirically. We focus on Catalonia, a bilingual society where everyone is
fully procient in Spanish, to isolate linguistic preferences from communica-
tive benets. Moreover, we exploit the language-in-education reform of 1983
to identify the causal e¤ects of language skills. Results indicate that the pol-
icy change has improved the Catalan prociency of native Spanish speakers,
which in turn increased their propensity to nd Catalan-speaking partners.
Hence, the acquisition of apparently redundant language skills has expanded
cooperation across speech communities.
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1 Introduction
The days when most human beings could go through their life using exclusively their
native language are long gone. The latest wave of globalization, and The Internet in
particular, has dramatically increased individualsexposure to multiple languages.
It has been estimated that more than one-half of the worlds population speak more
than one language (Tucker, 2001). Thus, it is not surprising that multilingualism
is attracting a great deal of attention, also among economists. Indeed, economic
research has clearly established that language skills have a signicant inuence on
economic outcomes. Studies in two specic areas provide useful examples. First,
it has been shown that sharing a common language promotes international trade
(e.g., Frankel and Rose, 2002; Melitz, 2008). Second, evidence from a variety of
countries indicates that uency in the host countrys language has a large e¤ect on
immigrantsearnings (e.g., Bleakley and Chin, 2004; Chiswick and Miller, 2007).
Not surprisingly, these results have been mostly attributed to the role of languages
as communication devices. After all, the ability to communicate (either directly or
through translators) is crucial in trade, as well as in production.
Undoubtedly, the acquisition of additional language skills is bound to facili-
tate communication and reduce production and transaction costs. However, to
focus exclusively on this dimension, and characterize languages as interchangeable
communication codes, can easily lead to quite extreme and misguided views. For
instance, Church and King (1993) concluded that multilingual societies should only
promote the majority language and hence restrict the use of minority languages to
intra-community exchanges.1 In a similar vein, Jones (2000) argued in favor of a
convergence towards a single world language. The central argument is analogous
to the benets of technological compatibility. If languages are alternative, equally
e¢ cient standards, the social optimum requires standardization. From this perspec-
tive, the death of languages is seen as a natural, and even desirable, phenomenon in
an increasingly globalized world. Similarly, policies that protect minority languages
and promote linguistic diversity are suspected of pandering to narrow interests, and
presumed harmful for the society as a whole.
1They formalized the idea that learning a second language generates network externalities.
Since individuals do not internalize these externalities, their incentives to learn second languages
are ine¢ ciently low. As a result there is room for public intervention. In their model, the cost of
learning a second language is the same for everyone. Hence, in the social optimum, speakers of
the majority language remain monolingual and communication barriers are eliminated by inducing
the minorities to learn the majority language.
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By and large, economists have recognized that languages are much more than
neutral communication devices. A prominent example is the recent book by Gins-
burgh and Weber (2011). They note that preserving linguistic diversity involves
non-negligible costs. However, individuals tend to develop some kind of emotional
attachment to the language that better denes their identity; therefore, limiting the
number of languages also generates losses.2
Hence, policy makers should pay attention to both the role of languages as means
of communication as well as their subjective, emotional aspects. Unfortunately, we
know very little about the relevance of these potential trade-o¤s. Even some basic
questions remain largely unexplored. For example, how relevant is the subjective
dimension of a language? Does it a¤ect individual behavior in the marketplace or
in other social interactions? What does it imply for the design of e¢ ciency-oriented
policies?
In this paper we address these issues both theoretically and empirically. We rst
present a theoretical model that illustrates a new channel by which the distribution
of language skills in a bilingual society a¤ects the pattern of social interactions.
We build on standard theory and assume that sharing a common language is a
prerequisite for some types of economic and social interactions.3 On top of this, we
introduce the notion of linguistic preferences. We assume that even fully bilingual
individuals are not indi¤erent about the language to be used in various situations.
These preferences, whose intensity may depend on the individual, may reect an
emotional attachment to the individuals native language or the language adopted
as their own in later stages.4
The model considers a bilingual society that has initially an asymmetric distrib-
ution of language skills: all native speakers of the weak language are bilingual, with
full command of both the strong and the weak language, but most native speakers
of the strong language are either monolingual or only partially procient in the
weak language. Thus, all agents share a common language, and hence the role of
2In their own words: Sustaining a high degree of societal diversity could require allocating
substantial resources to creating educational institutions and developing communications and
coordination between groups . . . . Since language is an intimate part of individual and group
identity, restricting linguistic rights may alienate and disenfranchise groups of individuals whose
cultural, societal, and historical values and sensibilities are perceived to be threatened(page 11).
3See, for instance, Selten and Pool (1991), Church and King (1993), and Weber et al. (2011).
4Some kind of linguistic preferences have already been introduced in a variety of economic
frameworks. See, for example, Grin (1992), Wickström (2005), Caminal (2010), and Mèlitz (2012).
Our main focus is on how language skills and preferences a¤ect cooperation between speech com-
munities and on the use of the minority language.
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linguistic preferences can be isolated from the communicative benets. Cooperation
(trade partnerships, marriages, etc.) requires communication and hence the use of
a particular language. Such a choice is trivial when all partners belong to the same
speech community. However, in the case of mixed partnerships, individuals with
strong linguistic preferences may reject optimal partners (in terms of non-linguistic
dimensions) and instead match with less desirable, but linguistically homogeneous,
partners. In other words, the formation of mixed partnerships requires a satisfac-
tory resolution of a linguistic conict. The crucial observation is that the intensity
of the conict varies with language skills. In particular, as native speakers of the
strong language improve their skills in the weak language: (i) the frequency of
mixed partnerships increases, (ii) the use of the weak language also increases.5
We then test these predictions exploiting data from two successive waves of a
survey conducted in Catalonia (Spain). The survey provides detailed information
on the socio-demographic and linguistic attributes of the respondents as well as the
linguistic characteristics of their partners. There are two main reasons why Cat-
alonia is a unique test eld. First, it is a bilingual society (Spanish and Catalan
are the two main languages) where the ability to communicate has never been at
stake, at least, throughout its recent history, because of the universal knowledge
of the strong language (Spanish), just as in the theoretical model. Hence, any im-
plications of additional language skills must be attributed to linguistic preferences.
Second, new language-in-education policies were introduced three decades ago, after
the approval in 1983 of the Language Normalization Act (LNA). With the imple-
mentation of this legal reform, education experienced a smooth transition from a
system in which Catalan was excluded to one in which Catalan has become the
main language of instruction in compulsory education. This policy reform led to a
signicant improvement of the Catalan skills of native Spanish speakers, whereas all
other language skills remained basically unchanged.6 Hence, the heterogeneous ef-
5It is important to note that if we abstract from learning costs, such an improvement in
language skills increases the total surplus. The reason is that the equilibrium rate of mixed
partnerships is ine¢ ciently low, because individuals do not internalize the negative externalities
inicted on their potential partners when they unilaterly decide to match with an inferior but
linguistically homogeneous partner. This welfare result may provide an e¢ ciency justication for
public policies that promote the learning and use of weak languages (provided the learning costs
are not excessive).
6We are referring to oral skills, which are the most relevant regarding the formation of a couple.
As discussed in Section 4; written skills in Catalan improved for both Spanish and native Catalan
speakers, although much less so for the latter group, and Spanish skills remained at very high
levels for both speech communities.
4
fect of language exposure during compulsory education allows us to generate causal
estimates of the variable of interest.
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to study the inuence of language skills
on the formation of mixed couples and the use of the weak language (Catalan).7
In order to identify the causal e¤ect, we exploit an Instrumental variable based on
the di¤erential e¤ect by native language of exposure to Catalan as a language of
instruction during compulsory schooling. Such an exposure variable was used by
Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) in their study of the impact of the education
reform on identity formation, taking a reduced-form approach.8 Since the amount
of exposure to the language-in-education reform during compulsory education is
imputed on the basis of year of birth, this variable itself could a¤ect partnership
formation and language use directly, due to general cohort e¤ects in the outcomes
of interest. For this reason, and in the spirit of Bleakly and Chin (2004, 2008,
2010), we include native Catalan speakers in the analysis in order to control for
these non-linguistic e¤ects. Therefore, assuming that both native Catalan and
native Spanish speakers were equally a¤ected by common trends in the cohorts,
the identifying variable is the interaction between the exposure to Catalan during
compulsory schooling and a dummy variable for being a native Spanish speaker.
Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. In particular, the edu-
cation reform of the 1980s, by improving the oral Catalan skills of native Spanish
speakers, raised their propensity to nd a Catalan speaking partner and to speak
only Catalan with the partner. Hence, these results indicate that linguistic pref-
erences are relevant: as a result, the acquisition of language skills that appear
redundant from a communicative viewpoint can signicantly reduce segregation.
The results turn out to be robust to a battery of sensitivity and falsication tests.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the
theoretical framework and derive two testable hypothesis. In Section 3 we provide
some historical background. Section 4 contains the empirical strategy designed to
test the main hypothesis. The data set is described in Section 5. The main results
7It has been shown (Bleakly and Chin, 2010, Furtado and Theodoropoylos, 2011; and Chiswick
and Hoseworth, 2011) that the frequency of inter-ethnic marriages among US immigrants is posi-
tively a¤ected by English-speaking ability. See also Meng and Meurs (2009) for the case of France.
Since the prociency of individuals in the strong language varies a lot from individual to individual,
these studies cannot distinguish between linguistic preferences and communicative benets.
8In Section 9 we argue that the e¤ect of the education reform on couple formation is largely
unrelated to changes in identity patterns. On the e¤ect of language policy on identity, see also
Aspachs et al. (2008).
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and robustness checks are presented in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Section
8 discusses the empirical strategy and results concerning the second hypothesis.
Finally, Section 9 summarizes the paper and discusses the results from an identity
perspective.
2 The theory
Our stylized model portrays a new channel by which the distribution of language
skills in a bilingual society a¤ects the pattern of social interactions. Following the
standard theory, we assume that sharing a common language is a prerequisite for
most social or economic interactions. On top of this, we introduce the notion of lin-
guistic preferences. If bilingual individuals are not indi¤erent about their language
of use, then the universal knowledge of a lingua franca, although it guarantees com-
munication, does not remove all the obstacles to cooperation between members of
di¤erent speech communities. In this context, the acquisition of language skills that
may appear redundant have new, non-trivial e¤ects. We rst present the simplest
version of the model, and subsequently will discuss various extensions.
2.1 The benchmark model
Consider a country with two languages, called A and B. A fraction  of the popu-
lation is initially socialized in A (they are native A speakers), and a fraction 1  
in B (native B speakers). Everyone is fully competent in their mother tongue.
These two languages di¤er in their status abroad. In particular, A is widely known
in the rest of the world and hence very useful for communicating with foreigners.9
As a result, native B speakers have strong incentives to learn A. We assume that
they do and, moreover, achieve full competence in A, so that they can perfectly
communicate with domestic, monolingual native A speakers. In other words, the
universal knowledge of A implies that the ability to communicate in any domestic
interaction is not at stake. Such an assumption holds in many real world examples,
including Catalonia, the subject of our empirical study.10 Moreover, it allows us
to emphasize the role of languages beyond their communicative value. The model
can be easily extended to take into account a fraction of monolingual speakers of
9Another reason could be that knowledge of A provides access to an abundant supply of media
outlets and leisure goods produced in that language.
10Other well-known examples include Wales and the Basque country.
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B. But in that case, language skills a¤ect segregation not only through linguistic
preferences but also through changing the ability to communicate.
In contrast, B has no value abroad and hence native A speakers can only benet
from learning B if this additional skill facilitates domestic interactions. Hence,
native A speakers have weaker incentives to learn B: We dene below a parameter
that represents the level of prociency in B of native A speakers.11
Individuals derive utility from forming partnerships with other compatriots (e.g.,
trade partnerships, couples).12 In particular, each individual can match a single
person. The level of utility obtained from a partnership depends on linguistic as
well as non-linguistic factors. With respect to the latter, for each agent i there is
a single best match, j, which is reciprocal (so that js best match is also i). The
best match generates, for each partner, a level of utility gij > 0 (pair-specic). For
simplicity, we suppose that all other potential matches provide the same level of
utility, which is normalized to zero.
The activities of the partnership require communication, and hence the use of
a particular language. Therefore, it is important whether or not the two members
of a best match belong to the same speech community.13 If they are, then nothing
prevents the formation of the best match, since each partner obtains gij; which is
higher than any alternative. However, if they belong to di¤erent speech communities
(a mixed match), then language preferences can prevent the formation of the best
match. More specically, let individual a be the native A speaker, and b the native
B speaker of a mixed match. If they form the partnership and choose A as the
language of communication, then a and b would obtain a payo¤ of gab and gab wb,
respectively: That is, individual b incurs a cost wb for using their second language.
Individuals di¤er in the intensity of their linguistic preferences. In particular, we
assume that wb is the realization of a random variable w distributed over some
interval [0; w] with density function f (w) ; and distribution function F (w) : We
assume that f (w) > 0 for all w 2 [0; w] and there are no mass points. If instead
11In some cases, like Wales or the Basque country, the stronger language outside the region is
also the native language of the majority ( is large). However, in other cases, like Belgium, and
especially Quebec, the strong international language is the native language of a minority ( is
small). However, in contrast to our model, in the last two examples a signicant fraction of the
weaker speech community is monolingual. See also the discussion at the end of this section.
12For simplicity, we ignore potential foreign partners.
13If everyone has the same probability of being i0s best match, independently of their native
language, then the probability of a linguistically homogeneous best match is  for a native A
speaker and 1   for a native B speaker: We will go back to this issue below.
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they choose B, then their payo¤s would be gab   a   wa and gab, respectively.
That is, if individual a uses B instead of A; this incurs an extra cost of wa + a,
where wa represents again the cost for using as second language (pure preference),
whereas a  0 represents the disutility caused by a limited prociency in the second
language. Hence, individuals with a better command of B have lower values of .
For simplicity, we assume that both speech communities have identical distributions
of pure preferences. That is, wa and wb are two independent realizations of the
random variable w. Whereas w is a xed individual characteristic,  can vary,
depending on public policies and individuals learning e¤orts.14 It is important to
note that the value of the outside option for both partners is 0 since there is always
a member of their own speech community among their second best partners, and
hence they do not need to worry about the language of use in such a contingency.
In the case of mixed matches, and depending on the values of gab; wa; a; wb,
potential partners must decide whether or not to form the partnership, and the
language of use in case they do. We consider the following bargaining environment.
First, we assume that all these parameters are common knowledge.15 Second, we
assume that if both parties agree on forming the partnership, then they choose the
language that maximizes the joint surplus. Both assumptions aim at minimizing
the frequency of disagreements. The only friction that remains in place is that
one party cannot compensate the other for the use of a second language (non-
transferable utility).16 Hence, a will accept forming the partnership and use B only
if gab   a   wa  0: Similarly, b will accept using A only if gab   wb  0: These
two participation constraints imply that in equilibrium the coalition will be formed
if and only if
min fa + wa; wbg  gab
It is important to note that these participation constraints imply that individuals
do not internalize the negative externality imposed on their potential partners in
case they unilaterally decide not to form the partnership. For instance, suppose that
gab  a wa < gab wb =  ", where " < gab. That is, the e¢ cient language of use
14It would make sense to assume that a0s limited competence in B, a > 0, can also reduce bs
payo¤. No qualitative result would be a¤ected by such an adjustment.
15Asymmetric information would only exacerbate the ine¢ ciency of equilibria, without bringing
about additional insights.
16Some real world examples may be better described by transferable utility (monetary compen-
sations may be feasible). However, if there is asymmetric information on preferences, and/or if
strategic considerations prevent the e¢ cient language from always being implemented, then the
main qualitative result (best matches break up too frequently) would also hold.
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in this particular match is A: However, b cannot accept forming the match, using
A; and incurring a loss of ". However, the refusal to form the match is detrimental
to a, who loses gab; which is higher than ". More generally, if decisions were taken
by a social planner aiming at maximizing total surplus (rst best), then the best
match would be formed if and only if
min fa + wa; wbg  2gab
Figure 1a depicts the equilibrium outcome (i.e., when individuals are allowed to
unilaterally abstein from the best match), for the case w > 2gab. The region marked
with N (no best match) corresponds to the case where one of the parties prefers not
to make the match. Regions marked with A and B correspond to the cases where
the partnership is formed and that particular language, A or B, is selected.
Figure 1b represents the socially e¢ cient outcome (the solution that maximizes
total surplus). Comparing the two gures, it becomes apparent that there is a
region of parameter values for which the best match is not formed in equilibrium
but should form according to the rst best.17
We are particularly interested in studying the impact of a general reduction in
a: that is, an improvement in native A speakersprociency in B. In order to
avoid uninteresting technical issues, in the rest of the exposition we will focus on
the particular case that gab = g and a is distributed on

; 

with a certain density
function that takes strictly positive values in this interval, and has no mass points.
Moreover, a and wa are assumed to be independent variables. It will be convenient
to rst compare two extreme scenarios. Suppose rst that for all a, a is su¢ ciently
high (the exact condition is   g). That is, all as are essentially monolingual, or
at least their prociency in B is so low that it will never make a di¤erence in the
formation of a best match. Let us call such a distribution of language skills Scenario
0:In this case, B will never be used in a mixed match, and hence such a matchs
formation will exclusively depend on bs linguistic preferences. In particular, the
best match will be formed if and only if wb  g: Alternatively, suppose now that
all as are fully competent in B: i.e.,  = 0 for all a: Let us call this Scenario 1:
In this case, both languages are in a symmetric position, and hence the outcome is
also symmetric: both languages are used with a fty percent chance. Moreover, the
17Instead of choosing between A and B, we could have allowed linear combinations of the two
languages, assuming, for instance, that individual utility decreases linearly with the fraction of
time in which the second language is used. The qualitative results would remain unchanged.
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fraction of best matches that materialize is higher than in Scenario 0. That is: (i)
if wb  g; as in Scenario 0, all best matches happen; moreover, (ii) if wb > g, then
those matches where wa  g also materialize.
The comparative statics are analogous if we consider gradual, but general changes
in a: In other words, suppose we start from a situation where a positive fraction of
as are willing to make the best match and use B: that is, < g. Let us describe an
improvement in as prociency in B as a shift in the distribution of as such that the
initial distribution rst-order stochastically dominates the nal distribution (some
positive mass of as experience a reduction of their a), and such a shift involves at
least an interval of a with a < g: Then, we obtain the following result:
Result 1 If native A speakers improve their prociency in B; then (i) the fraction
of successful mixed matches increases, and (ii) B is used more often in
those matches:
See the Appendix for details.
Result 1 is the main hypothesis we want to test in the empirical analysis. That
is, an exogenous improvement in the prociency in the weak language on the part
of native speakers of the strong language reduces segregation and fosters the use of
the weak language.
We can now investigate the welfare consequences of such a change in language
skills. First, we focus again on the two extreme scenarios. If all as are monolingual
(Scenario 0), then the average payo¤s to the as and bs are given by
U0a = F (g) g
U0b = F (g) g  
Z g
0
wbdF (wb)
Thus, the best match will materialize with probability F (g), in which case each
party obtains g: However, the bs bear all the costs of using their second language.
That is, in Scenario 0, bilingual individuals are worse o¤ than monolingual individ-
uals.
Alternatively, if all as are also fully competent in B (Scenario 1), then the
average payo¤s are
U1a = U
1
b = F (g) g 
Z g
0
Z wa
0
wbdF (wb) dF (wa)+[1  F (g)]

F (g) g  
Z g
0
wbdF (wb)

Consider bs expected utility (it is symmetric for the as). With probability F (g),
wa < g; the match is feasible and each member obtains g; which explains the rst
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term of the above expression. However, in this region, b incurs the cost of using
A whenever wb < wa, which is the second term. Also, wa > g with probability
1  F (g), In this case, the match is feasible only if wb < g, in which case b always
incurs the full costs of using A, which is the third term.
Note that the bs are better o¤ in Scenario 1: U1b > U
0
b . Also, the total surplus is
higher in Scenario 1: U1a+U
1
b > U
0
a+U
0
b . However, the as may be better o¤or worse
o¤ in Scenario 1: U1a may be higher or lower than U
0
a : The reason for this ambiguity
is the following. Compared to Scenario 0; in Scenario 1; on the one hand, a benets
from the higher frequency of successful best matches, which increases from F (g) to
F (g) [2  F (g)] : On the other hand, they lose their power to impose their preferred
language, and have to bear half of the costs of using their second language.18. In
other words, even abstracting from learning costs, native A speakers may or may
not benet from learning B. In contrast, native B speakers always benet from
this change, since on top of the higher frequency of successful best matches, they
enjoy a better language treatment.19 Finally, the total surplus is always higher in
Scenario 1. That is, in case native A speakers lose, they lose less than the amount
gained by native B speakers.20 There are two reasons why Scenario 1 generates a
higher total surplus than Scenario 0. First, Scenario 1 generates a higher rate of
occurrence of best matches. Second, it allows a reduction in the total discomfort
from using the second language, since B can now be used whenever wa < wb:21
In the Appendix we show that the same comparative statics hold for gradual
but general changes in a. That is, if we start from a situation where < g, then
we obtain the following result:
Result 2 A general reduction in a; abstracting from learning costs, (i) always
raises native B speakersaverage payo¤, (ii) may or may not raise native
A speakersaverage payo¤, and (iii) always raises aggregate payo¤s.
Result 2 provides a welfare assessment of the comparative statics of Result
1. That is, an exogenous improvement in the prociency in the weak language
18For example, if f (w) = 1w , then U
0
a   U1a takes a positive value if w   g is su¢ ciently small,
and takes a negative value if w   2g is also su¢ ciently small.
19Notice that the third term of U1b is positive and the second term has a lower absolute value
than the second term of U0b :
20Hence, if monetary transfers across speech communities are feasible, and learning costs are
not too high, then Scenario 1 dominates.
21Notice again that the third term of U1a is positive. Also, 2
R g
0
R wa
0
wbdF (wb) dF (wa) <R g
0
wbdF (wb) :
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among native speakers of the strong language raises total welfare, at least if we
abstract from learning costs. However, it may also have non-trivial distributional
implications.
2.2 Discussion
Assortative matching. The previous description of the model was silent about
how the best matches are determined. All we did was to show how language skills
and preferences inuence the intensity of the linguistic conict and determine the
rate at which a potential match translates into a realized match. A more sophis-
ticated model would embed our bargaining problem into an environment where
individuals face search and matching frictions and engage in directed search. In
such a scenario, one would expect that individuals with strong preferences would
be more likely to nd a best match within the same speech community. Thus, in-
e¢ cient matching would result not so much from the externalities associated with
the bargaining failures (as in our benchmark model) but also from the complemen-
tarities in search e¤orts. In any case, an increase in the fraction of bilingual native
speakers of the strong language is likely to reduce endogamy and raise the total
surplus.
Endogenous learning. In the benchmark model, we have treated as pro-
ciency inB as an exogenous parameter. This is compatible with the empirical analy-
sis, where we emphasize the exogeneity of policy actions (language-in-education
policies). However, language skills can also be the result of voluntary decisions
taken by individuals. In other words, causality can also work in the opposite di-
rection: a native A speaker engaged in a mixed partnership has incentives to exert
a higher e¤ort in order to improve their command of B: Our empirical strategy
focuses on one direction of causality (from language skills to couple formation), but
clearly does not rule out the possibility of causality in the opposite direction. In
any case, it is important to note that even if causality from mixed matches to the
acquisition of additional language skills was relevant, this would not diminish the
crucial role of linguistic preferences. In other words, if we observe that an individual
involved in a mixed match, in spite of the fact that the ability to communicate is
not at stake, is willing to undertake a costly e¤ort in order to acquire additional
language skills, then this also indicates that individualslinguistic preferences are
indeed a relevant factor in the formation of linguistically mixed matches.
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Monolingual minority speakers. Another useful generalization of the bench-
mark model would consist in relaxing the assumption that all the members of the
weak speech community are fully competent in the strong language.22 If a fraction
of the bs are monolingual, then Result 1 would still hold. More specically, an
improvement in as prociency in B (lower a) would increase the fraction of mixed
matches. The argument is the same one used in deriving Result 1, but reinforced
by the presence of an additional channel. A reduction in a increases the proba-
bility that a is willing to form the match and use language B: But now such an
adjustment applies to a larger base: not only those potential matches with high
values of wb (the pure preference e¤ect), but also to those matches with high values
of b (better communication e¤ect). For the same reason, such an improvement in
language skills expands total welfare by a greater amount, and improves the use of
B. Finally, a general improvement of bs prociency in A (a general reduction in b)
will have the symmetric e¤ects (more successful best matches and more frequent
use of A):
Learning costs. Our welfare results ignored learning costs. Of course, a com-
plete discussion of the policy implications of our model would require considering
not only the benets, which has been our focus, but also the costs. In any case,
two straightforward remarks are in order. First, public e¤orts to promote the weak
language are more likely to raise the total net surplus when the sizes of the two
speech communities are not very di¤erent: As  falls, starting from a level higher
than one-half, the total costs associated with learning the weak language are re-
duced and at the same time the potential gains from cooperation between speech
communities increases. Second, if the two languages are relatively close, then the
learning costs are lower and hence promoting the weak language becomes cheaper.23
3 Historical background
Catalan can be regarded as the native language of Catalonia. It is a Romance
language, originating from Latin in the territory in the ninth century. As a result
of the expansion of the Catalano-Aragonese crown, it soon spread out into other
22Such an assumption does not t, for instance, the cases of Belgium, Quebec, the Ukraine, or
Latvia.
23Both conditions are met in the case of Catalonia: the two main speech communities have a
similar size and, as discussed in the next section, both languages have evolved from Vulgar Latin,
and hence the distance between them is relatively small.
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regions, such as Valencia and the Balearic Islands (where it is still spoken) and
overseas.24 Spanish (Castilian), another Romance language, arrived in Catalonia as
early as the fteenth century and consolidated its position among the elites during
the eighteenth century. The general population remained primarily monolingual
in Catalan, and only gained access to Spanish with the expansion of elementary
education (Branchadell, 2006).25
During Francos dictatorship (19391975), Catalan was restricted to the private
sphere, and nevertheless transmitted (mostly orally) from parents to children in
a large fraction of the native Catalan families. In contrast, Spanish was the only
o¢ cial language and the only language used in education. Towards the end of this
period, repression against Catalan eased to some extent: books and magazines writ-
ten in Catalan started getting published (of course, subject to censorship), but the
presence of Catalan in public events was systematically precluded. Moreover, the
social use of Spanish in Catalonia was strongly reinforced by the massive migration
from southern Spain (especially in the 1960s). By the end of the 1970s, Catalan was
the native language of almost one-half of the population, who at the same time were
fully competent in Spanish. In contrast, most of the native Spanish speakers (40%
of the population of Catalonia had been born outside the region) were monolingual
or only passively bilingual (Woolard and Gahng, 1990; Siguan, 1991).
During the transition from dictatorship to democracy, the reestablishment of
the (provisional) regional government of Catalonia (the Generalitat provisional)
prompted the rst attempts at promoting the Catalan language. In particular, over
the period 19781982, Catalan became a compulsory subject (three hours per week)
in all schools. Also, a small fraction of primary schools (whose pupils were mostly
native Catalan speakers) adopted Catalan as the medium of instruction.
The true turning point for language-in-education policies arrived a bit later, after
the constitution of the permanent regional government (the Autonomous Commu-
nity) in 1980. The new entity soon acquired decision powers in important areas
such as education and the public media. In 1983, the regional parliament passed
(unanimously) the Language Normalization Act(LNA), which aimed at making
24Catalan literature ourished during the Middle Ages with writers such as Ramon Llull and
Joanot Martorell (author of the celebrated Tirant lo Blanc).
25Massive school enrollment did not take place in Spain until the twentieth century. Even
though elementary education became compulsory in 1838, the percentage of the primary-school age
population enrolled in school was only 42% in 1872, far below the levels prevailing in contemporary
France and England (Nuho¼glu Soysal and Strang, 1989).
14
all pupils fully competent in both languages (Spanish and Catalan) by the end of
compulsory education. It also dened an integrative education model, in which
children were not separated on the basis of the language spoken at home.
The LNA set the legal framework that allowed the dramatic changes in lan-
guage policy that occurred over the next two decades. However, its application was
gradual. In the period 19841993, the two languages were taught as subjects for a
similar amount of hours. Also, they were both used as the language of instruction in
proportions that varied over time (the average fraction of subjects taught in Catalan
increased over time) and geographycally, depending on the linguistic characteristics
of the students and teacherslanguage skills.26
The LNA also introduced language immersion programsin the primary schools
and preschools, inspired by those implemented earlier in Quebec. These programs
were aimed at schools in predominantly Spanish-speaking neighborhoods. Schools
in immersion programs used Catalan as the only language of instruction for the rst
years of education and followed a specic methodology to stimulate the acquisition
of Catalan as a second language. Spanish was introduced as an additional language
of instruction only at a later stage (normally grade 3). Immersion programs were
tried in 1984 in a handful of schools, but they expanded very quickly. In 1990 they
involved about one-fourth of all public schools.
As a result, at the beginning of the 1990s, Catalan had become the preferred
language of instruction in most primary schools, although Spanish was still dom-
inant in secondary education (Artigal, 1997).27 Since 1994, the authorities (after
a favorable ruling by the Spanish Constitutional Court) gave Catalan full priority
as the language of instruction in all public educational institutions, but in practice
Spanish has also been used, particularly in secondary education (Muñoz, 2005).28
In summary, education experienced a gradual transition from a system from which
Catalan was excluded to one in which Catalan has become the main language of
26Some minimum mandatory requirements were set. Catalan had to be used as the language of
instruction in at least one area of study (out of eight) from grades 3 to 5, and in two areas from
grade 6 onwards, while Spanish had to be used as the language of instruction in at least one area
throughout the entire curriculum.
27The share of primary schools using Catalan as the main medium of instruction rose from 42%
in 1986 to 73% in 1992, while those employing both Catalan and Spanish decreased from 33% to
24% over the same period (Vila-i-Moreno, 2000, and Vila-i-Moreno and Galindo-Solé, 2009).
28Unfortunately, we do not have more precise information on the evolution of the average number
of hours taught in each language, or their geographical variation. All we know is that the use
of Catalan increased over time and that di¤erences in language policies between schools did not
cause a signicant reallocation of students.
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instruction, at least in compulsory education.29
Such an asymmetric treatment of the two languages has apparently produced
a fairly symmetric distribution of language skills. At the end of compulsory edu-
cation, studentslevels of prociency in Catalan and Spanish are similar (Consell
Superior dAvaluació del Sistema Educatiu, 2013). Moreover, the level of pro-
ciency in Spanish of students coming out of Catalan schools is similar to the rest
of Spain (Instituto de Evaluación, 2011). From a dynamic perspective, the educa-
tional reform improved the oral Catalan skills of native Spanish speakers (and the
written skills of both native Catalan speakers and native Spanish speakers), with
basically no e¤ect on the Spanish skills of either speech community.30
The regional authorities also sought to promote the knowledge and use of Cata-
lan using a variety of means. For instance, in 1983 the regional government launched
a Catalan-only TV channel (and a radio station) that managed to capture about
20% of the audience on average. The same year, it started the rst catalanization
campaign (Norma), which was followed by successive campaigns with di¤erent goals
and formats. Finally, the Language Policy Lawof 1998 also introduced several
requirements that raised the value of Catalan skills in the labor market.31
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in the empirical analysis are drawn from the Survey of Language
Use of the Catalan Population, a representative survey that is carried out by the
Catalan Statistical Institute (IDESCAT). We use two repeated cross-sections (waves
2008 and 2013), which originally contain 6,767 and 7,255 observations, respectively.
The database is unique, especially regarding sociolinguistic characteristics. On top
of the standard socio-demographic variables (gender, year of birth, place of birth,
place of residence, education, etc.), it reports various linguistic variables of special
interest for our analysis: the respondents native language (rst language spoken at
home during childhood), habitual language (most frequently used), the language of
29The education reform a¤ected not only the language of instruction. New textbooks and in-
structional materials replaced the ones produced under the supervision of Francos educational
authorities, and new generations of school teachers, better educated and more procient in Cata-
lan, joined the system. Also, specialized teachers were hired to full the LNAs objectives.
30See also Vila (2008) and references contained there.
31For instance, it established prociency requirements in Catalan to access public sector jobs,
and introduced various regulations a¤ecting the language choices of retailers, restaurants, and
hotels.
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self-identication, as well as the respondents prociency (understanding, speaking,
writing and reading) in both Catalan and Spanish. All these variables are self-
reported. The survey also includes several questions about the respondents (current
or former) spouse or partner.32 We pay special attention to the partners language33
and to the relative use of Catalan (with respect to Spanish) with the partner.
Moreover, the survey also includes detailed information about family background
and parental language habits.
The restricted sample used in the baseline analysis includes individuals born in
Catalonia and those born in the rest of Spain who migrated to Catalonia at age 6 or
earlier. The goal is to focus exclusively on individuals who completed their entire
schooling in Catalonia. We also exclude individuals born before 1950, after 1990,
and those who were students at the time of the survey. Given the main research
question, it is also natural to exclude individuals who never had a partner (less than
7% of the restricted sample). Finally, in order to reduce the degree of unobserved
heterogeneity in the data, we also discard the very few remaining observations of
individuals whose native language or whose partners native language is neither
Spanish nor Catalan. The resulting restricted sample has 5,357 observations, 2,553
from the 2008 wave and 2,804 from the 2013 wave.
Individualsnative languages (as well as the habitual and self-identication lan-
guage) are classied into three categories: (1) only Catalan, (2) both Catalan and
Spanish, and (3) only Spanish. Thus, an immediate question is how to classify the
middle group: that is, where to draw the line between these two speech communi-
ties. In the baseline analysis we choose a strict denition of the Spanish speaking
community (the main focus of the analysis) and hence allocate the middle group to
the Catalan speaking community. In other words, we say a respondent is a native
Spanish speaker if they reported option (3), only Spanish, as their native language.
According to this denition, native Spanish speakers amount to about 45% of the
restricted sample (2,396 individuals). The rest (individuals selecting options (1)
and (2), 2,961 observations) are classied as native Catalan speakers. Of course,
32We do not know the legal status of their relationship (married or not), but we do know
whether or not they live together. In fact, some of our results are strengthened when we restrict
the analysis to stable couples (those who live together).
33Unfortunately, this information is collected in a slightly di¤erent way in the two waves of
the survey. In 2008, the survey inquired about the partners habitual language, whereas in 2013,
about the native language. Since the results are virtually identical when we estimate the model(s)
separately for each wave (results available upon request), such a small inconsistency in data
collection is not likely to have a sizeable impact on the results.
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we checked that the main results are robust to alternative denitions.
The language prociency variables are coded with a 010 scale, with 0 being
the lowest, and 10 the highest, level of prociency. We claim that oral skills (and
in particular, the ability to speak) are crucial in couple formation, whereas writing
skills are much less important. Moreover, our empirical strategy can be more easily
justied if we restrict attention to oral skills. Figure 2 displays the average oral
prociency in Catalan and Spanish (and a quadratic tted line) by year of birth,
for both native Spanish speakers and native Catalan speakers. As expected, oral
Catalan prociency is uniformly high for native Catalan speakers (who acquired
oral competency during childhood within the family), whereas successive cohorts of
Spanish speakers exhibit a clear positive trend. Moreover, oral Spanish uency is
stable across the cohorts and ranges around 9.5 for both speech communities. Thus,
native Catalan speakers are largely bilingual (with an excellent command of both
languages), whereas earlier generations of native Spanish speakers had a limited
command of Catalan, and younger generations are becoming increasingly bilingual,
possibly due to the language-in-education reform.
For the sake of comparison, Figure 3a displays written Catalan skills. Note that
written prociency improves for the younger cohorts of both speech communities,
with a more pronounced increase for native Spanish speakers. As in the case of oral
skills, the level of written Spanish prociency (Figure 3b) is uniformly high and
virtually identical for both speech communities. Note that this evidence clearly
identies Spanish as the strong language, as dened in the theoretical model: that
is, the language shared by all speech communities.34
The partners language is also classied into the same three categories as the
respondents native language. In the baseline analysis, we dene a respondents
partner as a Catalan speaker if either option (1) or (2), Catalan-only or Catalan
and Spanish, is reported, which is consistent with the above denition of the re-
spondentsnative languages. Language use with the partner is instead coded with
an ordinal scale (from 1 to 5): (1) only Catalan, (2) more Catalan than Spanish, (3)
equal Catalan and Spanish, (4) more Spanish than Catalan, and (5) only Spanish.35
In the baseline analysis we choose a strict denition of the use of Catalan: we say a
34This evidence is also compatible with the results of the systematic tests mentioned in Section
3 conducted by the national educational authorities.
35The distribution of this variable is quite concentrated on the extreme options, (1) and (5):
only 16% of the sample report an intermediate option.
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respondent uses Catalan with the partner if option (1) has been reported: i.e., only
Catalan. Once again, various robustness checks have been conducted.
Table 1 shows that Catalan society is noticeably fragmented along linguistic
attributes. In particular, about two-thirds of native Spanish speakers have a part-
ner who speaks only Spanish. Since we have assigned intermediate cases to the
Catalan speaking community, the level of endogamy for native Catalan speakers is
even higher (about three-quarters). An important observation is that endogamy is
related to language skills. More specically, native Spanish speakers with high oral
prociency in Catalan (with an index greater than or equal to 8) have a signicantly
lower level of endogamy (about 7 percentage points less). Similarly, the fraction of
native Spanish speakers that use only Catalan with their partner also increases by
a similar amount when we condition on high prociency in Catalan.
These results are compatible with the predictions of the theoretical model: there
is a positive association between additional language skills that are redundant from
the communicational viewpoint, and linguistic fragmentation in partnership forma-
tion. In the rest of this paper we investigate in more detail the empirical relevance
of the theoretical results. First, we present a simple regression setup in which we
take into account the observable covariates and provide conditional correlations.
Second, we apply an instrumental variable strategy that allows a causal interpre-
tation of the results. Finally, we present several robustness checks and sensitivity
analyses. The full set of control variables that are used in the rest of the paper is
presented in Table 2, together with basic descriptive statistics by language group.
5 Descriptive evidence: OLS estimates
We consider two di¤erent left-hand-side variables: (i) an indicator that takes the
value of 1 if individual i is matched with a Catalan-speaking partner, and zero
otherwise, and (ii) an indicator that takes the value of 1 if individual i uses only
Catalan with their partner, and zero otherwise. For each of the two outcomes, we
specify a linear probability model (OLS):
Yit = + 
0Xi + Cati + t + "it (1)
where the outcome Y of individual i born in year t depends on a set of controls,
X, oral prociency in Catalan, Cat, year of birth xed e¤ects, ; and a random
disturbance, ". The coe¢ cient of interest is . We start with a parsimonious
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specication that includes as controls a dummy for wave, a gender indicator, and a
cubic polynomial of age, which picks up age di¤erences that are not fully captured
by cohort dummies.36
We next include several controls for parental background (parentsplace of birth,
education, habitual language) and for individual attributes (place of birth, place of
residence, and completed education), in order to check whether the coe¢ cients that
relate language skills with partnership formation and language use are robust to
the inclusion of a more demanding set of controls.
Given that the testable hypothesis refers to native speakers of the strong lan-
guage, we start by presenting the results obtained for the subsample of native
Spanish speakers. Selected estimates for the two outcomes are presented in Table
3 (the complete results can be found in Tables A1a and A1b in the Appendix).
The estimates from the baseline specication (column a) indicate that a marginal
increase in oral prociency in Catalan is associated with an increase by about 4:5
percentage points in the probability of having a Catalan-speaking partner. Simi-
larly, better skills in the weak language on the part of native speakers of the strong
language is associated, to a similar extent, with a higher likelihood of using only
Catalan with the partner. These conditional correlations are similar, but slightly
lower, when we control for parental and individual characteristics (columns b, c,
and d).37
Essentially, the only statistically signicant parental characteristic seems to be
the parents habitual language. Having at least one parent whose habitual lan-
guage was Catalan is positively related to the two outcomes. Conditional on the
parentshabitual language, their place of birth is not signicantly related with the
probability of choosing a Catalan-speaking partner.
In contrast, several individual controls are signicantly correlated with the two
outcomes. If the place of birth, and even more importantly, the place of residence,
is an area with a relatively high fraction of Catalan speakers, the propensity to
36Notice that the use of two di¤erent cross-sections enables the simultaneous inclusion of age
and year of birth (since the sample contains individuals born in the same year but of di¤erent
ages), which is especially useful for the identication strategy discussed in the next section.
37We are aware of the fact that the above-mentioned controls are unlikely to represent exoge-
nous covariates. This is because some of the individual characteristics (like place of residence and
education) are choice variables, potentially related to the error term of the outcome equation(s).
Moreover, parental characteristics, as well as individual place of birth, could reect unmeasured
parental characteristics that are potentially endogenous with respect to the two outcomes. There-
fore, the evidence regarding these control variables must be interpreted with caution.
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choose a Catalan-speaking partner and/or to use only Catalan with the partner is
higher. Having completed tertiary education is also positively related with both
outcomes.
The results obtained by applying OLS to the subsample of native Spanish speak-
ers are virtually identical to those obtained from the pooled sample of both Spanish
and native Catalan speakers, as shown in Table 4. This means that most of the
conditional correlations between oral prociency in Catalan and the two outcomes
are driven by the variation observed within the Spanish speaking community.
Overall, the evidence using observational data is consistent with the predictions
of the theoretical model. Namely, in a bilingual territory where virtually every-
one is fully procient in the strong language, better skills in the weak language
on the part of native speakers of the strong language is associated with a higher
frequency of mixed couples and a more intensive use of the minority language with
the partner. Nevertheless, these conditional correlations might not represent the
causal mechanism portrayed by the theoretical model.
Indeed, using observational data to estimate the causal relation between lan-
guage prociency and couple formation, or language use, is challenging for three
main reasons. First, partner choice/language use and language skills are likely to
be correlated with common unobserved factors, opening the door to the typical
omitted variable bias. Second, language competence is self-reported, and hence
measurement error bias could also be an issue due to the systematic tendency to
over-report language skills. Third, we observe language skills only at the time of the
interview, but this variable itself is likely to be a¤ected by the linguistic character-
istics of the partner. In other words, a native Spanish speaker is likely to improve
their Catalan prociency if matched with a Catalan speaker. This implies that
reverse causality might also generate an additional source of inconsistency. Overall,
OLS estimates of the relations between language prociency and couple formation
or language use are unlikely to reect the causal parameters of interest. Therefore,
in the next section we present the identication strategy that enables us to obtain
(plausibly) causal estimates, and hence a more powerful test of our theory.
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6 Causal evidence: Identication strategy and IV
estimates
6.1 Empirical framework
This section describes the empirical strategy to generate consistent estimates that
can be interpreted as causal relations rather than conditional correlations. We
exploit the change in the language of instruction that took place in Catalan schools
after the implementation of the Language Normalization Act (LNA) of 1983.
The LNA aimed specically at turning the entire Catalan population bilingual,
regardless of linguistic origins and family background. Hence, the exposure to
the new language-in-education policy generated an exogenous improvement in the
Catalan skills of younger cohorts, especially of native Spanish speakers.
Two important remarks are in order. First, oral skills in Catalan improved
only for native Spanish speakers, since Catalan was in any case orally transmitted
within Catalan-speaking families. Second, exposure to the language-in-education
reform depends on the year of birth but also on the number of years of schooling.
However, the second variable is endogenous. Therefore, in order to isolate the
exogenous component we adopt the strategy followed by Clots-Figueras and Masella
(2013), who restricted attention to exposure during compulsory education. They
constructed a variable that measures the (potential) number of years of compulsory
schooling under the linguistic regime introduced by the 1983 reform, which can be
interpreted as an Intention to Treatvariable.38 More specically, Clots-Figueras
and Masella (2013) assumed that individuals born in 1977 or after received all their
compulsory schooling in Catalan, while those born between 1970 and 1976 were just
partially exposed to the reform, with one year of exposure for the former cohort,
up to seven years for the latter cohort. Individuals born before 1970 were never
a¤ected. The length of compulsory education in Spain was eight years under the
legal framework implemented in 1974 (Ley General de Educación) from ages 6 to
14. A new law passed in 1990 (LOGSE) extended the number of years of compulsory
education to ten (from ages 6 to 16). This means that individuals born before 1983
38That is, the number of years of schooling in Catalan, assuming: a) no grade repetition, b)
perfect compliance with compulsory age of school attendance, and c) uniform use of Catalan as
medium of instruction in the schools. The last assumption is the most restrictive, since in the
early years of application of the reform, the use of Catalan for general teaching purposes was
weaker in schools with a majority of native Spanish speakers. However, the focus of our analysis
is precisely the e¤ect of the reform on native Spanish speakers (for whom the treatment was less
intense). In this sense, we are probably capturing a lower-bound e¤ect.
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were subject to eight years of compulsory schooling, and those born in 1983 or after
to ten years. 39
Thus, the variable capturing compulsory exposure to Catalan at school, cet, can
be conveniently expressed in the following way:
cet =
8>><>>:
10; if t  1983
8; if 1977  t < 1983
t  1969; if 1970  t < 1977
0; if t < 1970
(2)
Notice that the variation in cet is only determined by the individuals year of
birth, which is obviously not a choice variable. Indeed, cet seems to be an appealing
way to extract an exogenous component from the positive trend in oral language
skills observed over the successive cohorts of native Spanish speakers. However,
this variable itself is unlikely to be a valid exclusion restriction to identify the
causal e¤ect of language prociency on outcomes. In fact, cet could capture both
the language prociency e¤ect of the LNA as well as other cohort e¤ects that
potentially a¤ect directly the outcomes of interest (i.e., partnership formation and
language use), through non-language-related channels.
In order to control for the direct (common) e¤ects of birth cohort on the out-
comes of interest, we include native Catalan speakers in the analysis. This is in the
spirit of the identication strategy proposed by Bleakley & Chin (2004, 2008 and
2010). They estimate the (private and social) returns to English prociency among
US immigrants, exploiting the well-established fact of the existence of a critical
periodof language acquisition (i.e., immigrants who arrive in the host country at
a very young age assimilate the language more easily). Their identifying variable is
the interaction between age at arrival with a dummy that takes the value one if the
immigrant comes from a non-English speaking country. Under the assumption that
the non-language e¤ects of early migration are the same for immigrants arriving
from English speaking countries as for those from non-English speaking countries,
the di¤erential e¤ect of age at arrival for those who migrated from a non-English
speaking country should be purged of non-language-related e¤ects and thus would
represent a valid exclusion restriction.40
39The results are una¤ected by the change in the length of compulsory education, since we
obtained virtually the same results imputing eight years of exposure (instead of ten) also to
individuals born after 1982.
40Basically the same strategy has been applied by Miranda and Zhu (2013a, 2013b), and by
Isphording and Sinning (2012) to estimate the earnings penalty associated to limited English
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In our case, we exploit the fact that oral language skills (the most relevant
language attribute a¤ecting partnership formation) are also acquired within the
family at an early age. Hence, the language-in-education reform did not exert any
signicant e¤ect on the oral prociency in Catalan of native Catalan speakers or
the oral prociency in Spanish of native Spanish speakers. Moreover, the Spanish
skills of native Catalan speakers have remained very high and stable over cohorts.
Therefore, using the pooled sample of native Spanish speakers and native Cata-
lan speakers, we use the interaction between exposure to Catalan during compulsory
schooling (cet) and the indicator that identies native Spanish speakers as an exclu-
sion restriction, controlling for (common) cohort e¤ects in the outcomes of interest.
The underlying assumption of this identication strategy is that both language
communities were subject to the same general cohort e¤ects, except that we allow
the treatment (compulsory policy exposure) to a¤ect (with increasing intensity)
the oral prociency in Catalan of the treated cohorts of native Spanish speakers.
In other words, we assume that any specic e¤ect experienced by native Spanish
speakers a¤ected by the policy change should be (plausibly) attributed to better
language skills.
This identication setup can be easily represented by a two-equation system,
where the skills in oral Catalan (Cat) of individual i, born in cohort t and a native
speaker of l (l = Spanish; Catalan) is the dependent variable of the rst-stage
equation, which contains as right-hand-side variables a set of controls (X), year of
birth xed-e¤ects ('t), an indicator for native Spanish speaker (l = Spanish), and
its interaction with cet (as identifying variable):
Catitl = + 
0Xi + I (l = Spanish) + I (l = Spanish) cet + 't + uitl (3)
The second-stage equation explains the two outcomes of interest (having a
Catalan-speaking partner and language use with the partner) and includes pro-
ciency in oral Catalan as an endogenously determined covariate:
Yitl = + 
0Xi + I (l = Spanish) + IVCatitl + t + "itl (4)
Under the validity of the identifying assumption, the 2SLS estimation of Equa-
tions (3) and (4) should provide the causal e¤ect of oral uency in Catalan on each
of the outcomes (IV ) among native Spanish speakers who improved their language
prociency in the UK and the US, respectively, and by Isphording (2013) to estimate the return
to foreign language skills in Spain.
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prociency due to exposure to the language in their compulsory schooling. This is
because 2SLS provides an estimate of the endogenous right-hand-side variable that
exploits only the variability of language skills that is produced by the instrument
among the subpopulation of compliers (i.e., a local estimate of the treatment
e¤ect).41
It is important to emphasize that the assumptions under which our identication
approach is valid are not trivial, which is the reason why in Section 7 we present a
battery of robustness checks and falsication analyses.
6.2 Estimation results
Selected 2SLS estimates of Equations (3) and (4) are displayed in Table 5 (the
complete results of the rst-stage regressions can be found in Table A2 in the Ap-
pendix). Overall, the results obtained from our identication strategy are in line
with those obtained by OLS, and hence consistent with the theoretical predictions.
More specically, the causal e¤ect of better Catalan skills among Spanish speak-
ers on the probability of having a Catalan-speaking partner is just slightly higher
(but not statistically di¤erent) than the OLS estimate. Using the parsimonious set
of controls, a unit increase in uency in oral Catalan increases the likelihood of a
mixed match by 7.6 percentage points (versus an OLS estimate of 4.5 percentage
points for the joint sample). As we add parental controls, the point estimate drops
slightly, but still remains positive and highly signicant. However, in contrast to
the OLS strategy, including individual controls generates a modest increase in the
coe¢ cient of interest, while controlling for both parental and individual characteris-
tics provides virtually the same estimate as in the baseline specication. Regarding
the second outcome (the use of Catalan with the partner), our IV approach gener-
ates estimates that are much more similar to those obtained by OLS. In particular,
for the baseline specication (column (a)), a one unit increase in uency in oral
Catalan increases the probability of speaking only Catalan with the partner by 5.3
percentage points, slightly above the OLS estimates of 44.3 percentage points.
The e¤ect of parental and individual covariates on the second outcome are anal-
ogous to the rst outcome case, and hence the results of the baseline specication
appear very robust. The di¤erence between the OLS and 2SLS estimates could be
41In the empirical analysis, we take into account clustering of the standard errors at the year of
birthnative language level, which is the level of variation of our instrument.
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due to the fact that the latter estimator exploits all the variation that is observed
in the data, whereas the former is based only on the variation generated by the
instrument among the treated cohort of the subsample of native Spanish speakers.
Moreover, the presence of measurement error in self-reported language prociency,
which could cause a downward bias in the OLS estimate, could be an additional
(and probably complementary) explanation for this divergence. It is important to
note that the rst-stage estimates corresponding to our identifying variable (the in-
teraction between language exposure during compulsory schooling and the indicator
for being a native Spanish speaker), presented in the upper panel of Table 4, has the
expected sign and is strongly signicant. Thus, native Spanish speakers a¤ected by
the language policy did improve their oral prociency in Catalan. The correspond-
ing estimates obtained using di¤erent specications are quite stable. Moreover, the
F test for weak identication indicates that the instrument is su¢ ciently strong
in all specications. Overall, the results obtained from the IV strategy provide
empirical support for the causal predictions of the theoretical model. Thus, better
prociency in the weak language of native speakers of the strong language (gener-
ated by a plausibly exogenous source of variation) fosters their propensity to form
mixed partnerships and use the weak language more intensively. As mentioned
above, some of the assumptions used in our estimation strategy require further
scrutiny, especially because a causal nature depends on the overall validity of our
identication strategy. The next section presents the results of several robustness
checks and falsication analyses.
6.3 Sensitivity analyses
In this section we present several sensitivity analyses of our baseline specication.
Gender. So far we have assumed that gender di¤erences in the outcomes of
interest are well captured by a shift in the intercept, but it could be the case that
language skills have a di¤erent e¤ect on partnership formation and language use by
males and than by females. Therefore, we run separate estimations of Equations
(3) and (4) for males and females, for each of the two outcomes. The results for
partnership formation (second panel of Table A3 in the Appendix) reveal that the
e¤ect of Catalan skills on the probability of nding a Catalan-speaking partner is
somewhat higher for females, albeit not statistically di¤erent from the malescoef-
cient. FemalesCatalan use with their partner is also more sensitive to increased
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prociency due to language exposure, as shown in the third column of Table A3.
However, for the male subsample the coe¢ cient of interest is imprecisely estimated.
Age polynomial. As mention above, the use of two repeated cross-sections
breaks the perfect collinearity between the year of birth (which is used to identify
the cohorts that are a¤ected by the education reform) and age. Even so, a exible
functional form of the age e¤ect in both Catalan skills and partnership formation is
important since it helps in partialling-out the impact of age-related confounders that
are not fully picked up by year of birth xed e¤ects. In the baseline specication, we
included a third-order polynomial of age, which was the best compromise between
parsimony and strength of the identifying variable. Nevertheless, this choice is far
from a¤ecting the results of our model. As shown in Table A4 in the Appendix, the
results are insensitive to the choice of the age polynomials (ranging from a linear
specication to a fourth-order polynomial), and remain virtually unchanged even
when we saturate the model with the full set of age dummies as control variables
(column (d)).
Language groups. One source of concern is the role of individual or group
identity in explaining our baseline results. In the next section we discuss these
issues in more detail. For now, it is su¢ cient to note that when we exclude from
the sample respondents with Spanish as their native language and Catalan as their
language of self-identication (language switchers), then the main results (column
(a)) are very similar to the baseline estimation (compare columns (a) and (b) in
Table 6). In particular, the e¤ect of oral skills in Catalan on partnership formation
is slightly smaller, and the e¤ect on the use of Catalan, slightly higher. Moreover,
the instrument becomes much stronger and the coe¢ cients are estimated more
precisely.
One delicate decision in the denition of linguistic communities is the alloca-
tion of respondents and partners who appear to lie in the intersection: those that
have both Spanish and Catalan as their native/habitual language. We check for
robustness by excluding these intermediate responses. The results are presented
in columns (c)(e) of Table 6 and are in line with those obtained from the whole
sample. If we exclude intermediate respondents, then we observe a small reduction
in the e¤ect of Catalan prociency on both outcomes, whereas dropping individuals
having a partner who speaks both Catalan and Spanish barely a¤ects the results.
Couple stability and commitment. If we exclude respondents who do not
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have a partner at the time of the survey, but did in the past (column (f) of Table
6), then the results remain una¤ected. A probably more interesting exercise is to
exclude individuals who do not live with their partner at the time of the interview.
That is, we restrict the analysis to couples with a higher degree of stability and
commitment. The results indicate (column (g) of Table 6) that the causal e¤ect
of oral uency in Catalan on partnership formation and language use is then much
larger, which clearly reinforces our main message.
Alternative specication of the identifying variable. The exclusion re-
striction in our baseline specication is the interaction between the Spanish-speaker
indicator and a linear function of compulsory exposure (cet), which appeared to be
the best alternative. In fact, as shown in Table 7, the results obtained with linear
exposure are betterin terms of the strength of the instrument. In column (a) we
show the results obtained considering dummies for partial/full language exposure
during compulsory education, which yields a slightly higher estimate of the causal
parameter of interest for partnership formation and the same coe¢ cient as the
baseline for language use. Adopting a quadratic specication for years of exposure
to Catalan during compulsory education (column (b)) has virtually no impact on
the parameter of interest (relative to our baseline estimation), while the rst stage
estimate indicates that the quadratic term is not relevant. Lastly, we considered
dummies for each possible year of exposure, ranging from one to ten. The results
are presented in column (c) and are qualitatively similar to the baseline estimation,
with the exception of a modest increase in the language prociency coe¢ cient for
the second outcome. However, as can be seen, our preferred specication provides
a signicantly higher weak identication test, which is the rationale for our nal
choice.
6.4 Falsication and identication checks
In this section we discuss several checks concerning the validity of our identication
strategy.
Two placebo experiments. One component of the identifying variable, expo-
sure to Catalan during compulsory schooling, is dened purely as a function of year
of birth. The rationale for relying only on variation produced by year of birth was
to eliminate any endogenous component (such as school attainment) in the variable
capturing potential language exposure at school. However, such a decision comes at
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a cost, since compulsory exposure could capture spurious relations due to potential
cohort-specic trends in (language-related) couple formation and/or language use.
We have run two alternative placebo experiments, which aim at providing evidence
that our identifying variable is not contaminated by any spurious e¤ects.
In the rst placebo test, we consider an additional subsample of individuals who
were born in the same cohort as our main sample but migrated to Catalonia from
other Spanish regions only after completing compulsory education (i.e., they mi-
grated at 14 or later). We label them Mig. Therefore, based on their birth cohort,
we impute compulsory language exposure to this placebo cohort as if they had
received compulsory schooling in Catalonia (cet ). We then use the reduced form
equation to test for falsication. Equation (5) shows the reduced form representa-
tion of our baseline 2SLS approach.
Yitl = + 
0Xi + I (l = Spanish) + RF I (l = Spanish) cet + t + "itl (5)
where RF is the coe¢ cient that directlyrelates exposure to Catalan during com-
pulsory schooling among native Spanish speakers with the outcomes of interest. We
then extend the reduced form equation (5) to include a dummy that identies this
never-treated sample and its interaction with placebo compulsory exposure (cet )
and other control variables (included in X), that is:
Yitl = +
0Xi+I (l = Spanish)+RF I (l = Spanish)cet+!I (Mig)+I (Mig)cet+t+"itl
(6)
If there exists a contemporaneous trend in the outcome(s) across the cohorts,
that is common to both our main sample and to the auxiliary sample of migrants,
this would be picked up by the coe¢ cient : This would suggest that our exposure
variable is driven by such a trend and not by the language prociency e¤ect. The
reduced form estimates are presented in Table 8, where columns (a) and (b) cor-
respond to Equations (5) and (6), respectively. The results conrm the positive
e¤ect of exposure during compulsory schooling among Spanish speakers on the two
outcomes, whereas the coe¢ cient for placebo exposure among Spanish migrants is
not signicant, is small in size, and negative.42 Similar evidence is obtained when
we include years since migration to Catalonia (and its square) among the controls
(column (c)).
42Virtually all individuals belonging to the auxiliary sample of migrants are native Spanish
speakers. The results remain the same dropping the 30 observations of migrants who are native
Catalan speakers.
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The second placebo subsample consists of individuals born between 1944 and
1969 who were schooled in Catalonia before the reform was implemented (i.e., they
were never exposed to Catalan during compulsory schooling). That is, we impute
years of (pseudo) exposure to Catalan at school as ifthe reform had been applied
15 years before, in 1968 instead of 1983 (cet ). We estimate the reduced form model
(5), but using the subsample of Catalonian-born individuals (or migrated from the
rest of Spain, before age 6) who were never a¤ected by the compulsory component
of the reform:
Yitl = + 
0Xi + I (l = Spanish) + I (l = Spanish) cet + t + "itl (7)
Again, obtaining a positive and signicant coe¢ cient for placebo exposure would
cast doubt on the reliability of our (real) exposure variable, because it could be re-
ecting pre-existing cohort trends that apply to the outcomes of interest. However,
this is not the case, as suggested by the corresponding coe¢ cients in column (d)
of Table 8, which are also small in size and not statistically di¤erent from zero.
Overall, this evidence suggests that the compulsory exposure variable constructed
à la Clots-Figueres and Masella (2013) is unlikely to be capturing spurious relations
that are unrelated with the introduction of Catalan at school with the 1983 reform.
Native languages. We also address the validity of the second component of
the identifying variable: the denition of native Spanish speakers. It could be ar-
gued that the self-reported native language might not be an accurate representation
of such an exogenous characteristic; for example, respondents could be inuenced
by endogenous factors. In particular, some Spanish speakers might be tempted to
misreport their true native language in favor of Catalan (or Spanish and Catalan),
perhaps because of the inuence of the education reform on their self-identication.
In order to address these concerns, we have replaced the native language variable
used in the baseline estimations by two alternative proxies. In particular, an indi-
vidual is classied as a native Spanish speaker: (i) if both parents have Spanish-only
as habitual/native language (parental language) or, alternatively, ii) if both parents
were born outside Catalonia (parental origins). We then re-estimated our 2SLS
model using these two alternative denitions of language groups. The results ob-
tained for each of the two proxies of native language are presented in column (a) of
Tables 9a and 9b, respectively. These estimates are generally similar than those ob-
tained using the original native language variable. We only observe a mild reduction
in the coe¢ cient of Catalan skills on the partners language equation when individ-
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uals are classied into language groups by parental language, and somewhat higher
coe¢ cients for both outcomes when the groups are formed by parental origins.43
These results suggest that the baseline specication is generally robust to the
use of alternative proxies of native language. Although parental language, which is
also reported by respondents, could su¤er from the same problems than the native
language, parental origins is unlikely to be a¤ected by misreporting or other kinds of
errors, and is plausibly exogenous. Moreover, the fact that the estimates obtained
using this last proxy are higher than in the baseline is consistent with the idea
that the new sub-population of compliers are individuals a¤ected by the reform
with both parents born outside Catalonia, who are likely to be more sensitive to
exposure to Catalan at school. In other words, native Spanish speakers with at least
one parent born in Catalonia were probably exposed to Catalan through alternative
channels, and hence were less sensitive to the reform than their counterparts with
both parents born outside Catalonia.
The availability of two alternative proxies to dene language groups opens the
possibility of relaxing the main identifying assumptions in our model. Indeed, we
were able to specify two alternative overidentied 2SLS models, in which we use
exposure to Catalan interacted with both the native language indicator and each of
the two alternative proxies as exclusion restrictions. The results obtained from the
overidentied models are presented in column (b) of Tables 9a and 9b for Spanish
speaking parents, and parents of non-Catalan origin, respectively. In both cases, the
estimates of the coe¢ cients of interest are very similar to those obtained from the
baseline specication. More importantly, the Hansen J test for overidentication
does not reject the null hypothesis that the exclusion restriction can be reasonably
excluded from the outcome equation(s). Moreover, we are also able to perform an
additional (and related) exercise. We relax the hypothesis that the only channel
through which exposure to Catalan during compulsory schooling of native Spanish
speakerss a¤ects the outcomes is through language prociency, by including the
interaction between language exposure and each of these two proxies as a control in
the outcome equation(s). In this case, we obtain higher point estimates for Catalan
skills when we consider the rst proxy, which also lose precision (and strength of
43Notice that using parental language as a proxy for native language creates some ambiguity
in the (few) cases in which the individual declares that both parents had both Catalan and
Spanish as their habitual/native languages. However, the results are virtually the same when
these observations are excluded (detailed results available upon request).
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the instrument) due to the correlation between the exclusion restriction and these
control variables. When we instead control for parental origins interacted with
exposure to Catalan, the coe¢ cient of Catalan prociency for the partners language
equation is virtually identical to the baseline (but again imprecisely estimated),
while it becomes smaller for the language use equation. Nevertheless, in any case,
the coe¢ cients for the interaction between exposure to compulsory schooling and
the two alternative proxies for language groups is not statistically signicant and
very small in size (which is consistent with the evidence from the overidentication
test).
Common non-language e¤ects. We have also tried to relax the assumption
that the direct cohort e¤ects in the two outcomes are common to native Spanish
speakers and native Catalan speakers, which is a non-trivial underlying hypothe-
sis of our identication strategy. We allow for language-specic cohort e¤ects by
including interactions between year of birth and indicators of the above language
group proxies. This should capture potentially heterogeneous cohort e¤ects on each
of the two outcomes. Therefore, the 2SLS equations become
Catitl = + 
0Xi + I (l = Spanish) + I (l = Spanish) cet + 'lt + uitl (8)
Yitl = + 
0Xi + I (l = Spanish) + IVCatitl + lt + "it (9)
where l is one of the two proxies of native language, and the terms 'lt and
lt represent birth-cohort xed e¤ects that are allowed to di¤er by either parental
language or parental origins. The corresponding estimates are presented in column
(d) of Tables 9a and 9b, respectively, and show the same pattern that emerged from
the models that contain the interactions between exposure and language proxy as
controls. That is, the coe¢ cients for Catalan skills are somewhat higher (and impre-
cisely estimated) when parental language is considered as a proxy, while controlling
for parental origin-specic year of birth e¤ects yields the same point estimate for
Catalan prociency on partnership formation and a small and insignicant coe¢ -
cient for the language use equation.
Subsample of native Spanish speakers. As a nal exercise, we repeat the
2SLS estimation for the subsample of native Spanish speakers using the same spec-
ication as our baseline model, but using the interaction between parental origins
and exposure to Catalan as an exclusion restriction.44
44The heterogeneous e¤ect of exposure to Catalan by parental language cannot be used as an
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We estimate the model(s) for the whole sample of native Spanish speakers and
also excluding individuals whose partner has both Catalan and Spanish as a native
language. These results are displayed in columns (a) and (b) of Table 10. They are
qualitatively similar to those obtained from the whole sample, which exploits all the
variation among Spanish speakers to identify the causal e¤ects, while here the esti-
mates reect the variation among Spanish speakers with non-Catalan origins who
improved their oral uency in Catalan due to language exposure during compulsory
education. Nevertheless, the estimations are less precise and the identication is
somewhat weak, but still the results are in line with the evidence presented using
the simple OLS.
7 Concluding remarks
We have presented empirical evidence that endorses the idea that languages are
much more than neutral communication devices. In particular, we have shown
that policies that promote the acquisition of language skills that appear redundant
from a communicative viewpoint can signicantly reduce segregation along linguis-
tic lines. We have interpreted these results using an abstract notion of linguistic
preferences. Bilingual individuals are not indi¤erent about their language of use.
Hence, any form of social cooperation between members of di¤erent speech com-
munities must solve a potential conict of interest over the choice of language. As
more native speakers of the strong language become bilingual, the intensity of the
conict decreases and mixed partnerships become more likely.
Our notion of linguistic preferences is abstract in the sense that we have not
made any attempt to explain how these preferences are formed or are related to
more specic social phenomena. In particular, it is well known that language is a
key symbol of ethnic, national, or class identity. For the case of Catalonia, Woolard
(1989) has emphasized that ethnicity is critical to understanding language choices.
Thus, one may wonder if our results may simply reect the dynamics of ethnic pol-
itics in Catalonia. More specically, individuals may tend to look for partners in
their same ethnic group, and each group identity is signaled by a di¤erent language.
Perhaps the educational reform a¤ected the frequency of mixed couples (according
to our denition) not so much by changing language skills and reducing the lan-
exclusion restriction, since virtually all Spanish speakers have both parents who have only Spanish
as habitual language.
33
guage conict, but by inducing a fraction of native Spanish speakers to cross over
and become ethnically Catalan (that is, by assimilation). The main di¤erence
from our interpretation would be that according to such an ethnic perspective, the
acquisition of new language skills per se might not change ethnic barriers (after all,
native Catalan speakers have been bilingual for generations). However, ethnic or
cultural assimilation may be prompted by certain policies. In other words, it could
be the case that endogamy has remained roughly unchanged, but the composition
of ethnic groups has varied over time.
Our data set allows us to tentatively approach the issue of ethnic identity. In
particular, respondents report not only their native language but also their habit-
ual language, and the language of self-identication. We believe that ethnic issues
should be reected in these responses. In our baseline sample, only about 3% of
the native Catalan speakers report Spanish as their language of self-identication.
In contrast, about 20% of native Spanish speakers report Catalan as their language
of self-identication. When we eliminate these switchersfrom the sample, the re-
sults remain largely unchanged.45 Such a test suggests that language skills matter
independently of ethnic identity. Thus, we feel quite comfortable with our notion of
linguistic preferences, more general than the presumed link between language and
ethnic identity. Moreover, the fact that a fraction of native Spanish speakers who
maintain Spanish as their language of self-identication, and nevertheless use Cata-
lan (for instance, within the couple) is very important: it suggests that Catalan is
being perceived, at least by these group, as anonymous,that is, everyones lan-
guage, like most hegemonic languages, and not necessarily identied with a specic
ethnic group (native Catalans), like most minoritized languages.46
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9 Appendix
Result 1. Note that the frequencies of A;B; and N are given, respectively, by
Pr (A) = F (a) +
Z g
a
[1  F (wb   a)] dF (wb)
Pr (B) =
Z g a
0
[1  F (wa + a)] dF (wa)
Pr (N) = [1  F (g)] [1  F (g   a)]
Hence, A and N increase and B decreases with a:
Result 2. The expected utilities of those individuals in potential partnerships
with a < g are given by
Ua = [Pr(A) + Pr(B)] g  
Z g a
0
[1  F (wa + a)]wadF (wa)
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Ub = [Pr(A) + Pr(B)] g  
Z a
0
wbdF (wb) 
Z g
a
[1  F (wb   a)] dF (wb)
The e¤ect of a on Ua has an ambiguous sign:
dUa
da
=   [1  F (g)] f (g   a) g +
Z g a
0
f (wa + a)wadF (wa)+
+ [1  F (g)] (g   a) f (g   a)
However, both Ub and Ua + Ub decrease with a:
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     Figure 2a: Average Oral Proficiency in Catalan        Figure 2a: Average Oral Proficiency in Spanish 
 
 
	  
Figure 3a: Average Written Proficiency in Catalan     Figure 3b: Average Written Proficiency in Spanish 
 
 
 
Table 1: Partner’s Language and Language Use by Native Language 
 
 
% individuals with Catalan-speaking 
partners 
% using only Catalan with the 
partner 
 
unconditional Proficiency in Catalan ≥ 8 unconditional 
Proficiency in 
Catalan ≥ 8 
Catalan native speakers 75.65 76.14 77.2 77.82 
Spanish native speakers 35.77 42.63 15.73 22.22 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Language Groups 
 
 joint sample 
native Catalan 
Speakers 
native Spanish 
speakers 
 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
partner’s language = Catalan-only 0.578 0.494 0.757 0.429 0.358 0.479 
language used with the partner = Catalan-only 0.497 0.500 0.772 0.420 0.157 0.364 
Spanish native speaker (l = Spanish) 0.447 0.497 -- -- -- -- 
oral Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 8.825 2.027 9.589 0.870 7.881 2.577 
years compulsory education in Catalan (cet) 3.162 3.849 3.023 3.845 3.333 3.847 
wave 2013 0.523 0.499 0.522 0.500 0.525 0.499 
age 41.695 10.402 42.453 10.722 40.758 9.915 
male 0.487 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.473 0.499 
father place of birth = Barcelona 0.030 0.171 0.016 0.125 0.048 0.214 
Girona 0.220 0.414 0.287 0.452 0.138 0.345 
Tarragona 0.064 0.244 0.110 0.313 0.006 0.079 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.041 0.198 0.066 0.247 0.010 0.100 
Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.056 0.230 0.095 0.293 0.008 0.086 
Central Catalonia 0.071 0.257 0.120 0.324 0.011 0.104 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.056 0.230 0.093 0.290 0.010 0.102 
Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.035 0.185 0.061 0.239 0.004 0.061 
Basque Country and Galicia 0.009 0.092 0.008 0.090 0.009 0.095 
other Spanish regions 0.018 0.131 0.006 0.080 0.031 0.174 
other places 0.389 0.487 0.129 0.336 0.709 0.454 
miss father's place of birth 0.012 0.110 0.009 0.097 0.016 0.125 
mother place of birth = Barcelona 0.007 0.086 0.008 0.090 0.007 0.081 
Girona 0.234 0.423 0.305 0.460 0.146 0.353 
Tarragona 0.066 0.249 0.112 0.316 0.010 0.100 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.044 0.205 0.071 0.257 0.010 0.100 
Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.058 0.234 0.100 0.300 0.006 0.076 
Central Catalonia 0.068 0.251 0.113 0.316 0.012 0.109 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.058 0.235 0.095 0.293 0.013 0.115 
Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.033 0.179 0.057 0.231 0.004 0.064 
Basque Country and Galicia 0.019 0.136 0.019 0.135 0.019 0.137 
other Spanish regions 0.017 0.129 0.007 0.082 0.029 0.168 
other places 0.388 0.487 0.108 0.310 0.735 0.441 
miss father's place of birth 0.007 0.084 0.006 0.080 0.008 0.089 
Catalan used by parents = no Catalan 0.435 0.496 0.067 0.249 0.890 0.313 
Catalan used by father or mother 0.157 0.364 0.207 0.405 0.095 0.293 
Catalan used by father and mother 0.408 0.492 0.726 0.446 0.015 0.122 
missing parents' language 0.004 0.067 0.003 0.055 0.006 0.079 
highest parental education = no education 0.029 0.168 0.027 0.162 0.031 0.174 
primary 0.185 0.388 0.122 0.328 0.263 0.440 
secondary 0.495 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.489 0.500 
tertiary 0.201 0.401 0.238 0.426 0.155 0.362 
missing parental education 0.090 0.286 0.113 0.316 0.062 0.242 
number of observations 5357 2961 2396 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
42 
 
 
Table 2 (continued): Descriptive Statistics by Language Groups 
 
 joint sample 
native Catalan 
Speakers 
native Spanish 
speakers 
 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
individual's place of birth = Barcelona 0.503 0.500 0.402 0.490 0.628 0.484 
Girona 0.085 0.279 0.113 0.317 0.050 0.218 
Tarragona 0.065 0.246 0.070 0.256 0.058 0.233 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.065 0.246 0.108 0.311 0.011 0.104 
Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.097 0.296 0.129 0.336 0.056 0.231 
Central Catalonia 0.082 0.274 0.104 0.305 0.054 0.226 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.041 0.199 0.065 0.247 0.012 0.109 
Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.003 0.056 0.001 0.037 0.005 0.073 
Basque Country and Galicia 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.018 0.005 0.071 
other Spanish regions 0.057 0.232 0.005 0.073 0.121 0.326 
individual's place of residence = Barcelona city 0.145 0.353 0.120 0.325 0.177 0.381 
Barcelona's metropolitan area 0.314 0.464 0.205 0.404 0.449 0.497 
Girona 0.109 0.312 0.138 0.345 0.073 0.261 
Tarragona 0.078 0.269 0.079 0.269 0.078 0.268 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.071 0.257 0.114 0.318 0.018 0.131 
Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.126 0.332 0.140 0.347 0.110 0.313 
Central Catalonia 0.091 0.287 0.107 0.309 0.071 0.256 
Pyrenees 0.065 0.246 0.097 0.296 0.025 0.158 
completed education = primary or less 0.254 0.435 0.216 0.412 0.300 0.458 
secondary 0.458 0.498 0.439 0.496 0.481 0.500 
tertiary 0.267 0.443 0.323 0.468 0.199 0.399 
other education levels 0.021 0.143 0.022 0.145 0.020 0.140 
number of observations 5357 2961 2396 
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Table 3: Linear Probability Model Estimates (selected results)  
— Subsample of Native Spanish Speakers 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.044a 0.040a 0.036a 0.035a 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.040a 0.037a 0.029a 0.027a 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Parents’ controls NO YES NO YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES 
Number of observations 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted 
for year of birth clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All 
regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial and year of birth 
dummies. Regression in column (b) contains controls for paternal and maternal place of birth 
(with missing indicators), dummies for Catalan as parental habitual language and highest 
parental education (with missing indicators). Regression in column (c) includes controls for 
individual’s place of birth, place of residence and completed education (with missing 
indicator). Complete results are reported in Tables A1a and A1b in the Appendix. 
	  
	  
	  
Table 4: Linear Probability Model Estimates (selected results)  
— Joint Sample of Spanish and Catalan Speakers 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.045a 0.041a 0.037a 0.035a 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.043a 0.037a 0.031a 0.029a 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Parents’ controls NO YES NO YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES 
Number of observations 5,357	   5,357	   5,357	   5,357	  
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted 
for year of birth clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All 
regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial, an indicator for 
being native Spanish speaker and year of birth dummies. Regression in column (b) contains 
controls for paternal and maternal place of birth (with missing indicators), dummies for 
Catalan as parental habitual language and highest parental education (with missing 
indicators). Regression in column (c) includes controls for individual’s place of birth, place 
of residence and completed education (with missing indicator). Complete results available 
upon request. 
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Table 5: 2SLS Estimates (selected results) 
— Joint Sample of Spanish and Catalan Speakers 
 
 baseline (a) (b) (c) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a 0.115a 0.105a 0.104a 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)    
F-test of excluded instruments 91.66 93.41 96.84 85.01 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000]	   [0.000]	   [0.000]	  
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.068a 0.077a 0.073a 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)    
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053a 0.035a 0.057a 0.043a  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)    
Parents’ controls NO YES NO YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES 
Number of observations 5,357	   5,357	   5,357	   5,357	  
Note: 2SLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted 
for year of birth-native language clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c 
significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age 
polynomial, an indicator for being native Spanish speaker and year of birth dummies. 
Regression in column (a) contains controls for paternal and maternal place of birth (with 
missing indicators), dummies for Catalan as parental habitual language and highest parental 
education (with missing indicators). Regression in column (b) includes controls for 
individual’s place of birth, place of residence and completed education (with missing 
indicator). The F-test on excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-
test on the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the 
indicator for Spanish as initial language. Complete results of the first-stage regressions are 
reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity to Mixed Languages and Partnership Status 
 
 baseline (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a 0.199a 0.203a 0.116a 0.113a 0.114a 0.116a 0.114a 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.338 0.363 0.204 0.204 0.205 0.203 0.202 
F-test of excluded instruments  91.66 176.11 173.70 91.91 81.72 81.65 69.47 53.10 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.063a 0.067a 0.066a 0.082a 0.072a 0.075a 0.118a 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026)    
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.282 0.302 0.219 0.220 0.246 0.201 0.135 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used with the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053a 0.055a 0.062a 0.044a 0.057a 0.045a 0.047a 0.090a 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020)    
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.532 0.562 0.453 0.421 0.456 0.413 0.381 
Number of observations 5,357 4,276 4,175 5,117 5,019 4,829 4,654 4,157 
Note: regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth-initial language clusters. a 
Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age 
polynomial, an indicator for being native Spanish speaker and year of birth dummies. The F-test on excluded instruments refers to 
the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the 
indicator for Spanish as initial language. Robustness checks for language switches: (a) excluding individuals who switch from 
Spanish (native language) to Catalan (language of self-identification); (b) excluding individuals who switch from Spanish (native 
language) to Catalan (habitual language). Mixed languages: (c) excluding individuals who had Spanish and Catalan as native 
language; (d) excluding individuals whose partner has Spanish and Catalan as habitual/native language; (e) excluding individuals 
who had Spanish and Catalan as native language and those whose partner has Spanish and Catalan as habitual/native language. 
Partnership status: (f) excluding individuals who do not have a partner at the time of the survey; (g) excluding individuals who do 
not live with their partner at the time of the survey. 
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Table 7: Sensitivity to Alternative Specifications of the Identifying Variable 
 
 baseline (a) (b) (c) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a  0.162a  
 (0.012)  (0.042)  
I(l = Spanish) × (cet)2   -0.005  
   (0.004)  
I(l = Spanish) × I(no exposure)  ref. cat.       
I(l = Spanish) × I(partial exposure)  0.639a   
  (0.121)   
I(l = Spanish) × I(full exposure)  0.981a   
  (0.119)   
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 0)    ref. cat. 
     
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 1)    0.490a 
    (0.080) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 2)    -0.051 
    (0.079) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 3)    0.695a 
    (0.079) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 4)    0.775a 
    (0.079) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 5)    0.532a 
    (0.079) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 6)    1.098a 
    (0.081) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 7)    0.962a 
    (0.080) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 8)    0.888a 
    (0.140) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 9)    1.149a 
    (0.143) 
I(l = Spanish) × I(cet = 10)    0.490a 
    (0.080) 
F-test of excluded instruments  91.66 35.60 45.59 44.93 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.090a 0.076a 0.076a 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053a 0.057a 0.053a 0.061a 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Number of observations 5,357 5,357 5,357 5,357 
Note: regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for 
year of birth-initial language clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 
10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial, an 
indicator for being native Spanish speaker and year of birth dummies. The indicator for “full 
exposure” takes the value of 1 for individuals born in 1997 or after; the indicator for “partial 
exposure” takes the value of 1 for individuals born between 1970 and 1976 (included). The F-
test on excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the 
interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the indicator 
for Spanish as initial language. 
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Table 8: Falsification Analysis (Baseline and Placebo Reduced Form Equations) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS (REDUCED FORM) — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.009a 0.009a 0.007a  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
I(l = Spanish) × cet*  -0.002 -0.005  
  (0.017) (0.017)  
I(l = Spanish) × cet**    0.003 
    (0.003) 
Years since migration (squared)   YES  
Adjusted R2 0.185 0.194 0.195 0.209 
OLS (REDUCED FORM) — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.006a 0.006a 0.005a  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
I(l = Spanish) × cet*  0.017 0.014  
  (0.011) (0.012)  I(l = Spanish) × cet**    -0.003 
    (0.003) 
Years since migration (squared)   YES  
Adjusted R2 0.384 0.421 0.421 0.398 
Number of observations 5357 5934 5884 3417 
Note: regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth-
initial language clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All regressions 
include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial, an indicator for being native Spanish 
speaker and year of birth dummies. (a) reduced form equation for the baseline sample; regressions in 
columns (b) and (c) are obtained from the pool of the  baseline and the placebo samples, where the latter 
contains individuals who migrated from other Spanish regions after completing compulsory education. 
Placebo compulsory exposure (cet*) in columns (b) and (c) is imputed “as if” they received compulsory 
education in Catalonia. Regressions in columns (b) and (c) also include an indicator for belonging to the 
placebo sample and the respective interactions with control variables. Regressions in column (d) are 
based on a subsample of never-treated individuals (born between 1944 and 1969, in Catalonia or 
migrated before age 6); compulsory exposure (cet**) in column (d) is imputed “as if” the reform was 
applied 15 years before (i.e. in 1968 instead of 1983).	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Table 9a: Sensitivity to Alternative Language Definitions and Identifying Assumptions 
 
 baseline (a) (b) (c) (d) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a  0.075a 0.075a 0.074a 
 (0.012)  (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.017)    
I(l*= parents Spanish speakers) × cet  0.114a 0.048b  0.048b   
  (0.013) (0.022)    (0.022)     
φl*,t     YES 
F-test of excluded instruments  91.66 73.95 44.33 17.45 19.45 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.056a 0.063a 0.138b 0.142b 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.016)    (0.069) (0.069) 
I(l*= parents Spanish speakers) × cet    -0.010  
    (0.008)  θl*,t     YES Hansen J test for overidentification    1.302   
[p-value]   [0.254]   
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053a 0.055a 0.050a 0.094 0.093 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.016)    (0.061) (0.063) 
I(l*= parents Spanish speakers) × cet    -0.006  
    (0.008)  θl*,t     YES Hansen J test for overidentification   0.551   [p-value]   [0.458]   
Number of observations 5,357  5,193    5,193    5,193    5,193    
Note: a significant 1%; b significant 5%; c significant 10%. Standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) 
for the baseline model and in columns (b), (c) and (d) are adjuster for year of birth-initial language 
clusters, while standard errors in column (a) are adjusted for clusters at the year of birth-parental 
language (i.e. both parents are Spanish-only speakers) level. All regressions include dummies for wave 
and gender, a cubic age polynomial and year of birth dummies. The baseline regression and models in 
columns (b), (c) and (d) also contain an indicator for being native Spanish speaker; models in columns 
(a), (b), (c) and (d) also contain an indicator for individuals whose parents are both Spanish-only 
speakers. Regressions in column (d) include interactions between year of birth dummies and the indicator 
for individuals whose parents are Spanish-only speakers. The F-test on excluded instruments refers to the 
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at 
compulsory schooling and the indicator for Spanish as initial language and the indicator for having 
Spanish-only speaking parents respectively.  
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Table 9b: Sensitivity to Alternative Language Definitions and Identifying Assumptions 
 
 baseline (a) (b) (c) (d) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a  0.067a 0.067a 0.065a 
 (0.012)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
I(l*= non-Catalan origins) × cet  0.131a 0.071a 0.071a  
  (0.014) (0.026) (0.026)  
φl*,t      YES 
F-test of excluded instruments  91.66 85.51 45.78 12.39 12.51 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.006] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.085a 0.070a 0.081 0.081 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.048) (0.048) 
I(l*= non-Catalan origins) × cet    -0.002  
    (0.007)  θl*,t     YES Hansen J test for overidentification    0.042   
[p-value]   [0.839]   
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053a 0.089a 0.051a 0.014 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.044) (0.045) 
I(l*= non-Catalan origins) × cet    0.005  
    (0.007)  θl*,t     YES Hansen J test for overidentification   0.663   [p-value]   [0.416]   
Number of observations 5,357 5,357 5,357 5,357 5,357 
Note: a significant 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant 10%. Standard errors (within parenthesis in 
italic) for the baseline model and in columns (b), (c) and (d) are adjuster for year of birth-initial 
language clusters, while standard errors in column (a) are adjusted for clusters at the year of birth-non-
Catalan origins (i.e. both parents born outside Catalonia) level. All regressions include dummies for 
wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial and year of birth dummies. The baseline regression and models 
in columns (b), (c) and (d) also contain an indicator for being native Spanish speaker; models in columns 
(a), (b), (c) and (d) also contain an indicator for individuals with non-Catalan origins. Regressions in 
column (d) include interactions between year of birth dummies and the indicator for individuals with non-
Catalan origins. The F-test on excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on 
the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the indicator for 
Spanish as initial language and the indicator for non-Catalan origins respectively.  
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Table 10: 2SLS Estimates (Selected Results) — Subsample of Spanish Speakers 
 
 (a) (b) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l* = non-Catalan origins) × cet 0.096a 0.097a 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
F-test of excluded instruments 16.84 16.06 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.047 0.097b 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076b 0.079b 
 (0.032) (0.036) 
Number of observations 2,396	   2,396	  
Note: 2SLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted 
for year of birth-non-Catalan origins (i.e. both parents born outside Catalonia) clusters. a 
Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies 
for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial, an indicator for individuals whose parents are 
both Spanish-only speakers and year of birth dummies. Regression in column (b) excludes 
observations of individuals whose partner has both Catalan and Spanish as habitual/native 
language. The F-test on excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test 
on the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the 
indicator for having non-Catalan origins. 
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Table A1a: Linear Probability Model Estimates— Subsample of Native Spanish Speakers 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
constant -1.463b (0.583) -1.453a (0.524) -1.156b (0.564) -1.267b (0.515) 
proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.044a (0.003) 0.040a (0.003) 0.036a (0.003) 0.035a (0.003) 
wave 2013 -0.080a (0.019) -0.077a (0.019) -0.086a (0.019) -0.080a (0.019) 
age 0.133a (0.047) 0.125a (0.042) 0.108b (0.046) 0.112b (0.042) 
age2 -0.004a (0.001) -0.004a (0.001) -0.003a (0.001) -0.003a (0.001) 
age3 0.000a (0.000) 0.000a (0.000) 0.000a (0.000) 0.000a (0.000) 
male 0.046b (0.019) 0.048b (0.020) 0.047b (0.019) 0.048b (0.020) 
father place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona   0.084 (0.148)   -0.002 (0.148) Tarragona   0.051 (0.103)   0.031 (0.109) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)   0.058 (0.111)   -0.013 (0.100) Western Catalonia (Ponent)   0.013 (0.100)   -0.052 (0.100) Central Catalonia   0.115 (0.114)   0.047 (0.119) Pyrenees and Aran Valley   -0.169 (0.126)   -0.288
b (0.124) 
Balearic Islands and Valencia   -0.008 (0.127)   -0.043 (0.121) Basque Country and Galicia   -0.029 (0.068)   -0.068 (0.073) other Spanish regions   0.022 (0.036)   0.005 (0.037) other places   0.125
c (0.074)   0.100 (0.077) miss father's place of birth   -0.069 (0.043)   -0.074 (0.046) mother place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona   -0.064 (0.134)   -0.136 (0.131) Tarragona   -0.100 (0.087)   -0.111 (0.093) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)   0.213 (0.141)   0.144 (0.125) Western Catalonia (Ponent)   -0.040 (0.101)   -0.104 (0.101) Central Catalonia   0.079 (0.111)   0.013 (0.113) Pyrenees and Aran Valley   0.128 (0.178)   0.087 (0.178) 
Balearic Islands and Valencia   0.073 (0.094)   0.054 (0.095) Basque Country and Galicia   0.067 (0.064)   0.038 (0.063) other Spanish regions   0.040 (0.029)   0.024 (0.028) other places   0.155 (0.123)   0.122 (0.128) miss father's place of birth   -0.005 (0.104)   -0.005 (0.107) Catalan used by parents = no Catalan reference category 
Catalan used by father or mother   0.151
a (0.041)   0.144
a (0.041) 
Catalan used by father and mother   0.171
b (0.082)   0.167
c (0.084) 
missing parents' language   0.098 (0.126)   0.106 (0.124) highest parental education = no education reference category 
primary   0.042
c (0.022)   0.044
c (0.024) 
secondary   0.055 (0.034)   0.045 (0.038) tertiary   0.094
c (0.049)   0.081 (0.056) missing parental education   0.073 (0.057)   0.063 (0.056) 
year of birth fixed effects (θt) YES YES YES YES 
adjusted R2 0.071 0.081 0.092 0.098 
number of observations 2396 2396 2396 2396 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth clusters. a Significant at 
1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.	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Table A1a (continued): Linear Probability Model Estimates— Subsample of Native Spanish Speakers 
  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
individual's place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona     -0.035 (0.069) -0.018 (0.066) Tarragona     0.003 (0.047) 0.003 (0.048) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)     -0.177 (0.130) -0.223
c (0.116) 
Western Catalonia (Ponent)     0.092 (0.057) 0.117
b (0.057) 
Central Catalonia     0.039 (0.066) 0.046 (0.068) Pyrenees and Aran Valley     -0.063 (0.124) -0.040 (0.127) Balearic Islands and Valencia     0.239
b (0.105) 0.218c (0.109) 
Basque Country and Galicia     0.313
b (0.133) 0.328b (0.146) 
other Spanish regions     -0.034 (0.038) -0.017 (0.039) individual's place of residence = Barcelona city reference category 
Barcelona's metropolitan area     -0.006 (0.029) -0.000 (0.027) Girona     0.147
b (0.062) 0.147b (0.063) 
Tarragona     0.010 (0.050) 0.016 (0.052) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)     0.399
a (0.109) 0.392a (0.106) 
Western Catalonia (Ponent)     0.004 (0.050) 0.005 (0.051) Central Catalonia     0.095 (0.073) 0.098 (0.072) Pyrenees     0.254
a (0.087) 0.252a (0.089) 
completed education = primary or less reference category 
secondary     0.028 (0.025) 0.020 (0.026) 
tertiary     0.090
a (0.029) 0.067b (0.031) 
other education levels     -0.002 (0.072) -0.023 (0.075) 
year of birth fixed effects (θt) YES YES YES YES 
adjusted R2 0.071 0.081 0.092 0.098 
number of observations 2396 2396 2396 2396 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth clusters. a Significant at 
1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   53 
 
 
Table A1b: Linear Probability Model Estimates— Subsample of Native Spanish Speakers 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
constant -1.141b (0.445) -1.002b (0.436) -0.608 (0.402) -0.634 (0.408) 
proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.040a (0.002) 0.037a (0.002) 0.029a (0.002) 0.027a (0.002) 
wave 2013 -0.028c (0.016) -0.031c (0.016) -0.036b (0.015) -0.034b (0.016) 
age 0.073c (0.037) 0.056 (0.036) 0.029 (0.034) 0.028 (0.033) 
age2 -0.002c (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
age3 0.000b (0.000) 0.000c (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.006 (0.015) 0.012 (0.014) 0.009 (0.013) 0.011 (0.013) 
father place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona   0.096 (0.103)   -0.059 (0.102) Tarragona   0.014 (0.076)   -0.010 (0.076) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)   0.073 (0.143)   -0.006 (0.121) Western Catalonia (Ponent)   0.204
b (0.093)   0.105 (0.084) Central Catalonia   0.213
b (0.083)   0.116 (0.089) Pyrenees and Aran Valley   0.107 (0.119)   -0.015 (0.112) Balearic Islands and Valencia   0.042 (0.075)   0.012 (0.074) 
Basque Country and Galicia   0.105
b (0.044)   0.058 (0.044) other Spanish regions   0.048
b (0.021)   0.018 (0.022) other places   0.092 (0.063)   0.057 (0.073) miss father's place of birth   -0.008 (0.037)   -0.027 (0.040) mother place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona   -0.053 (0.102)   -0.193
b (0.094) 
Tarragona   -0.042 (0.072)   -0.062 (0.071) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)   0.306
b (0.138)   0.174 (0.123) Western Catalonia (Ponent)   0.035 (0.080)   -0.064 (0.087) Central Catalonia   0.018 (0.083)   -0.071 (0.075) Pyrenees and Aran Valley   0.043 (0.165)   0.017 (0.164) Balearic Islands and Valencia   0.016 (0.058)   0.018 (0.059) 
Basque Country and Galicia   -0.086
c (0.046)   -0.080 (0.049) other Spanish regions   0.015 (0.020)   -0.013 (0.019) other places   0.057 (0.081)   0.010 (0.091) miss father's place of birth   0.006 (0.062)   -0.000 (0.066) Catalan used by parents = no Catalan reference category 
Catalan used by father or mother   0.139
a (0.030)   0.126
a (0.030) 
Catalan used by father and mother   0.340
a (0.088)   0.335
a (0.083) 
missing parents' language   -0.069
c (0.039)   -0.047 (0.038) highest parental education = no education reference category 
primary   0.011 (0.018)   0.011 (0.020) secondary   0.014 (0.023)   -0.002 (0.026) tertiary   0.031 (0.040)   0.011 (0.048) missing parental education   0.060
c (0.032)   0.054
c (0.030) 
year of birth fixed effects (θt) YES YES YES YES 
adjusted R2 0.086 0.118 0.154 0.173 
number of observations 2396 2396 2396 2396 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth clusters. a Significant at 
1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.	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Table A1b (continued): Linear Probability Model Estimates— Subsample of Native Spanish Speakers 
	  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
individual's place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona     0.089
b (0.043) 0.117b (0.045) 
Tarragona     0.020 (0.033) 0.022 (0.032) 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)     -0.031 (0.132) -0.126 (0.125) Western Catalonia (Ponent)     0.137
a (0.038) 0.139a (0.041) 
Central Catalonia     0.104
b (0.051) 0.113b (0.048) 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley     -0.081 (0.115) -0.088 (0.119) Balearic Islands and Valencia     0.049 (0.115) 0.025 (0.118) Basque Country and Galicia     -0.143
a (0.048) -0.105b (0.047) 
other Spanish regions     0.001 (0.020) 0.019 (0.021) individual's place of residence = Barcelona city reference category 
Barcelona's metropolitan area     0.011 (0.018) 0.014 (0.018) 
Girona     0.132
b (0.050) 0.128b (0.052) 
Tarragona     0.026 (0.032) 0.025 (0.034) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)     0.428
a (0.096) 0.412a (0.093) 
Western Catalonia (Ponent)     0.061
b (0.030) 0.054c (0.031) 
Central Catalonia     0.093 (0.064) 0.085 (0.062) Pyrenees     0.332
a (0.091) 0.316a (0.088) 
completed education = primary or less reference category 
secondary     0.043
b (0.017) 0.047b (0.019) 
tertiary     0.143
a (0.024) 0.135a (0.026) 
other education levels     0.048 (0.053) 0.029 (0.056) 
year of birth fixed effects (θt) YES YES YES YES 
adjusted R2 0.086 0.118 0.154 0.173 
number of observations 2396 2396 2396 2396 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth clusters. a Significant at 
1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table A2: First-Stage Regressions  
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
constant 5.353a (1.658) 4.725a (1.665) 6.779a (1.655) 6.267a (1.656) 
native Spanish speaker (l = Spanish) -2.105a (0.071) -1.556a (0.103) -1.643a (0.069) -1.376a (0.102) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a (0.012) 0.115a (0.012) 0.105a (0.011) 0.104a (0.011) 
wave 2013 0.126b (0.060) 0.072 (0.062) 0.046 (0.059) 0.026 (0.062) 
age 0.367b (0.141) 0.320b (0.142) 0.161 (0.142) 0.159 (0.143) 
age2 -0.009b (0.004) -0.008b (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 
age3 0.000b (0.000) 0.000c (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
male -0.161a (0.051) -0.164a (0.050) -0.098b (0.049) -0.111b (0.049) 
father place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona   0.170
c (0.096)   -0.157 (0.128) Tarragona   0.151 (0.108)   -0.057 (0.120) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)   0.165 (0.109)   -0.182 (0.121) Western Catalonia (Ponent)   0.195
b (0.091)   -0.110 (0.108) Central Catalonia   0.209
c (0.107)   -0.204 (0.128) Pyrenees and Aran Valley   0.333
b (0.131)   -0.052 (0.144) 
Balearic Islands and Valencia   -0.282 (0.344)   -0.425 (0.378) Basque Country and Galicia   -0.055 (0.289)   -0.285 (0.272) other Spanish regions   0.063 (0.094)   -0.047 (0.095) other places   0.250 (0.230)   0.189 (0.230) miss father's place of birth   0.134 (0.189)   0.113 (0.177) mother place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona   0.085 (0.086)   -0.255
a (0.096) 
Tarragona   0.178
c (0.101)   -0.158 (0.126) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)   0.170 (0.104)   -0.243
c (0.125) 
Western Catalonia (Ponent)   0.134
c (0.073)   -0.217
a (0.079) 
Central Catalonia   0.007 (0.101)   -0.312
a (0.111) 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley   -0.101 (0.153)   -0.501
b (0.202) 
Balearic Islands and Valencia   0.050 (0.175)   0.061 (0.168) Basque Country and Galicia   0.282 (0.180)   0.170 (0.170) other Spanish regions   0.011 (0.101)   -0.119 (0.099) other places   -0.211 (0.281)   -0.424 (0.281) miss father's place of birth   -0.107 (0.329)   -0.210 (0.326) Catalan used by parents = no Catalan reference category 
Catalan used by father or mother   0.363
a (0.100)   0.241
b (0.096) 
Catalan used by father and mother   0.426
a (0.108)   0.302
a (0.108) 
missing parents' language   -0.094 (0.437)   -0.086 (0.402) highest parental education = no education reference category 
primary   0.466
a (0.096)   0.332
a (0.088) 
secondary   0.716
a (0.117)   0.427
a (0.101) 
tertiary   0.869
a (0.122)   0.464
a (0.098) 
missing parental education   0.215 (0.184)   0.178 (0.187) 
year of birth fixed effects (θt) YES YES YES YES 
adjusted R2 0.204 0.221 0.264 0.270 
number of observations 2396 2396 2396 2396 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth clusters. a Significant at 
1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.	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Table A2 (continued): First-Stage Regressions 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
individual's place of birth = Barcelona reference category 
Girona     0.289
b (0.127) 0.496a (0.158) 
Tarragona     0.617
a (0.166) 0.681a (0.185) 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)     0.255 (0.163) 0.438
b (0.185) 
Western Catalonia (Ponent)     0.332
a (0.120) 0.489a (0.139) 
Central Catalonia     0.222 (0.177) 0.483
b (0.202) 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley     0.124 (0.141) 0.444
b (0.206) 
Balearic Islands and Valencia     -0.753 (0.502) -0.730 (0.503) 
Basque Country and Galicia     -0.292 (0.725) -0.253 (0.658) other Spanish regions     -0.580
a (0.172) -0.444b (0.182) 
individual's place of residence = Barcelona city reference category 
Barcelona's metropolitan area     -0.169
b (0.084) -0.140c (0.084) 
Girona     0.160 (0.146) 0.189 (0.152) Tarragona     -0.215 (0.171) -0.144 (0.174) Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre)     0.329
b (0.159) 0.441b (0.175) 
Western Catalonia (Ponent)     0.144 (0.120) 0.186 (0.121) Central Catalonia     0.267 (0.164) 0.318
c (0.161) 
Pyrenees     0.365
a (0.112) 0.388a (0.120) 
completed education = primary or less reference category 
secondary     0.686
a (0.106) 0.615a (0.098) 
tertiary     1.206
a (0.139) 1.089a (0.133) 
other education levels     0.740
a (0.202) 0.660a (0.203) 
year of birth fixed effects (θt) YES YES YES YES 
adjusted R2 0.204 0.221 0.264 0.270 
number of observations 2396 2396 2396 2396 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth clusters. a Significant at 
1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.	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Table A3: 2SLS Estimates (selected results) — Separate Estimations by Gender 
 
 baseline males females  
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a 0.098a 0.128a 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)    
F-test of excluded instruments 91.66 41.07 77.91 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.070c 0.081a 
 (0.017) (0.036) (0.019) 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053a 0.034 0.069a 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.022) 
Number of observations 5,357 2,611 2,746 
Note: 2SLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted 
for year of birth-native language clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c 
significant at 10%. All regressions include a dummy for wave, a cubic age polynomial, an 
indicator for being native Spanish speaker and year of birth dummies; baseline regressions 
also contain a gender indicator. The F-test on excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-
Pischke multivariate F-test on the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at 
compulsory schooling and the indicator for Spanish as initial language.  
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Table A4: Sensitivity to Age Polynomial’s Order 
 
 (a) (b) baseline (c) (d) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.114a 0.115a 0.115a 0.116a 0.116a 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)    
Age -0.007c 0.053 0.367b 0.651                 
 (0.004) (0.044) (0.141) (0.452)                 
Age2  -0.001 -0.009b -0.020  
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.019)  
Age3   0.000b 0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000)  
Age4    -0.000  
    (0.000)  
Age dummies NO NO NO NO YES 
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.204    
F-test of excluded instruments 86.95 89.03 91.66 91.90 92.31 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.075a 0.076a 0.075a 0.076a 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)    
Age -0.024a -0.009 0.039 -0.019              
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.035) (0.113)              
Age2  0.000 -0.001 0.001  
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)  
Age3   0.000 -0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000)  
Age4    0.000  
    (0.000)  
Age dummies NO NO NO NO YES 
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.202 0.201 0.202 0.200    
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053a 0.053a 0.053a 0.053a 0.053a 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)    
Age -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.013                 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.032) (0.106)                 
Age2  0.000 0.000 -0.001  
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)  
Age3   0.000 0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000)  
Age4    -0.000  
    (0.000)  
Age dummies NO NO NO NO YES 
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.407    
Number of observations 5,357 5,357 5,357 5,357 5,357 
Note: regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of 
birth-initial language clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All 
regressions include dummies for wave and gender, an indicator for being native Spanish speaker 
and year of birth dummies.  The F-test on excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke 
multivariate F-test on the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory 
schooling and the indicator for Spanish as initial language. 
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